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COURTING ISLAM: PRACTICAL 
ALTERNATIVES TO A MUSLIM FAMILY 
COURT IN ONTARIO 
How do we honor two commitments, to multiculturalism and  
equity to the rule of law, that often seem to come into conflict? We 
have been struggling a bit. There really are conflicting values.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n the modern secular state there is a tension between the desire of 
the state to keep religion out of the public sphere, and thus not inter-
fere with individual freedoms, and the need of religious individuals to 
live as required by the tenets of their particular faith. Liberalism may 
concern itself with individual autonomy, but critiques of liberalism 
within the West have emphasized the need to consider the communal 
rights of minority groups, including religious groups.1 Islam, like some 
other faiths, prescribes a model of living for its adherents that encom-
passes the spectrum of daily life whether they live in an Islamic state or 
not.2 Critiques of liberalism have made a range of suggestions for minor-
ity groups, such as Muslims living in non-Islamic, Western democracies, 
that would grant them the ability to exercise communal rights.3 But this 
ongoing debate has yet to find the optimal way of protecting liberal ide-
als while also accommodating religious needs. Canada, like other liberal 
                                                                                                                                  
 *   Clifford Krauss, When the Koran Speaks, Will Canadian Law Bend?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2004, at A4 (quoting Marion Boyd, former Ontario Attorney General and 
Women’s Issues Minister). 
 1. See generally Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communi-
ties in Political Theory, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 31 (Will Kymlicka ed., 
1995); Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY 
CULTURES 228 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITI-
ZENSHIP (1995) (emphasizing the need to consider communal rights); cf. Jeremy Waldron, 
Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY 
CULTURES 93 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and their 
Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 256 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (consider-
ing the difficulties associated with communal rights). 
 2. See generally FREDERICK M. DENNY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM (2d ed. 1994) 
(discussing the Islamic religious system in Part III). 
 3. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 1; INTERCULTURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
ABORIGINAL CONTEXTS (Catherine Bell & David Kahane eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
INTERCULTURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kym-
licka ed., 1995). 
I 
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democracies, faces the challenge of accommodating4 the needs of its 
Muslim citizens while staying true to the ideals of its founding princi-
ples. Religious accommodation requires the state, the believer, and the 
religious community to compromise in order to reconcile fidelity to relig-
ion with fidelity to the secular ideals that make religious freedom possi-
ble. 
Syed Mumtaz Ali, the President of the Canadian Society of Muslims,5 
sees a major problem with Canadian democracy, in particular its han-
dling of minority rights, and has proposed a way to reconcile these com-
peting fidelities.6 He believes that the system has “[fallen] far short of the 
promise and potential that democratic theory has for meeting the social 
and political needs of a truly multicultural society.”7 The Canadian Soci-
ety of Muslims suggests that a way of dealing with this failure of Cana-
dian democracy is to establish Muslim arbitration tribunals.8 These tribu-
nals would enable Muslims to consent to their jurisdiction for disputes 
involving family law, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and cus-
tody. The tribunals would issue binding, court-enforceable decisions 
based on Muslim family law, subject to review in limited circumstances 
only.9 
In Part II, this Note will examine the Canadian Society of Muslims’ 
criticisms of Canadian democracy and their plan to establish Muslim ar-
bitration tribunals. It will also describe attempts made to reconcile secu-
lar and religious law in other countries including England, Australia, and 
the United States. It will focus on divorce as an example of the way in 
which compromise can be achieved between the state and religious 
                                                                                                                                  
 4. Ayelet Shachar has defined “accommodation” in the multicultural context, includ-
ing religion, as referring to “a wide range of state measures designed to facilitate identity 
groups’ practices and norms.”  AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS 17 
(2001). 
 5. The Canadian Society of Muslims is a non-profit Islamic organization founded in 
the 1960s by Dr. M. Qadeer Baig in Toronto, Ontario, and describes its main purpose as 
follows, “to promote interest in an intellectual, philosophic, and esoteric approach to the 
research, development and understanding of Islamic culture and civilization . . . and to 
co-operate with other organizations . . . which have objects similar in full or in part to the 
objects of the corporation.”  Canadian Society of Muslims, Who We Are, http://muslim-
canada.org/whoarewe.htm [hereinafter Who We Are] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 6. See generally Syed Mumtaz Ali & Anab Whitehouse, Oh! Canada! Whose Land, 
Whose Dream? (The Canadian Society of Muslims 1991) http://muslim-canada.org/ 
ocanada.pdf [hereinafter Oh! Canada!] (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Syed Mumtaz Ali, Establishing an Institute of Islamic Justice (Darul Qada) (The 
Canadian Society of Muslims 2002), http://muslim-canada.org/news02.html [hereinafter 
Darul Qada] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 9. Id. 
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communities.  In Part III, this Note will examine the meaning of religious 
freedom in Canada. In Part IV, this Note will examine the suggestions 
made by court reform commissions in Ontario and how the Muslim arbi-
tration tribunals would fit into the Ontario court structure. It will look at 
the concerns inherent in incorporating Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) into family law generally and more specifically at questions sur-
rounding the incorporation of religious ADR into family disputes. In Part 
V, this Note will examine the legal basis for the Muslim arbitration tri-
bunals through the Ontario Arbitration Act of 1991.10 In Part VI, this 
Note will utilize a model of multicultural accommodation to suggest the 
practical alternatives available to Ontario. Finally, this Note will con-
clude that while the Act may allow for the establishment of Muslim arbi-
tration tribunals, policy concerns advise against it and warrant an ap-
proach similar to the one used by England, Australia, or the United 
States. This approach is a combination approach that utilizes the private, 
ad hoc mechanisms of the Muslim community together with an aware-
ness and openness of the courts and legislatures to take into account the 
needs of its Muslim citizens. 
II. CRITICISMS OF DEMOCRACY AND ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION 
A. Mumtaz Ali’s Criticisms of Canadian Democracy 
While all religions seek to provide believers with a blueprint for daily 
living, Islam, along with Judaism, provide much more. With detailed 
systems of law, Islam and Judaism have maintained a closer kinship to 
one another than to their third counterpart, Christianity.11 Concerned with 
                                                                                                                                  
 10. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, (Can.), available at http://www.elaws.gov. 
on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en. 
 11. See F.E. PETERS, CHILDREN OF ABRAHAM (1982).  According to Peters, 
It is the person and the acts of Jesus that are crucial to Christianity, and it is 
precisely Jesus who separates the typology of Christianity from that of both Ju-
daism and Islam. Both Muslim and Jew are covenantors for whom the path to 
holiness lies in fidelity of heart and observance to that covenant. The Christian 
is asked not so much fidelity as faith, faith in Jesus who is, in his own person, 
the New Covenant. Jew and Muslim measure their fidelity by a deeply consid-
ered and articulated body of halakoth, behavioral norms that are the touchstone 
of orthopraxy; the Christian measures his faith by the instruments of orthodoxy, 
creeds, and definitions. The archetypical figure in traditional Judaism and Islam 
is the legal scholar, the rabbi or ‘alim; in traditional Christianity it is the priest, 
the mediator who, like the Arch-Mediator Christ, bridges the gap between the 
human and the divine. 
Id. at 198–99. 
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the here and now, both Islam and Judaism place an emphasis on the per-
fect practice of their believers, referred to as orthopraxy by some schol-
ars, rather than on the intricacies of metaphysics.12 The names for their 
divine law, sharia13 and halacha,14 mean “the way” or “the path” indicat-
ing that the manner in which the journey is undertaken is just as, if not 
more important than acceptance of doctrine.15 More than simply a sketch, 
they provide adherents with a detailed guide accompanied by precise 
regulations for daily life that encompass everything from prayer to per-
sonal grooming, religious sacrifice to diet, and charity to banking.16 In 
some areas, the religious regulations do not infringe upon the require-
ments of the secular state. In other areas, adherents may find they must 
either choose between the two or perform a double set of obligations, one 
religious and one secular, as in the case of divorce.17 The Canadian Soci-
                                                                                                                                  
 12. See DENNY, supra note 2, at 113. Denny succinctly states the relationship between 
the orthoprax religions of Islam and Judaism and the metaphysical centered Christianity, 
“Judaism, like Islam, is an orthoprax religion. Law has been the characteristic preoccupa-
tion of religious scholarship in Judaism, whereas theology has been central in Christian-
ity.”  Id. at 151. 
 13. Literally, sharia means “the way to the water hole” but other meanings include 
“the right path” and the late Islamic scholar, Fazlur Rahman, referred to it as “the ordain-
ing of the way.”  Id. at 195. 
 14. IRVING GREENBERG, THE JEWISH WAY 20 (Touchstone 1993) (1988). 
 15. Although Islamic law provides very detailed guidance to the believer, it is not 
monolithic and the law is not found entirely in the Quran. The two main sources of Is-
lamic law are the Quran, the divine revelation, and the Sunnah, the sayings and deeds of 
the Prophet Muhammad. Fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, is derived from these main 
sources through their early interpretation by Muslim jurists. Varied interpretation of the 
sources led to several schools (madhahib) of Islamic law. There are four major schools of 
Islamic law in the Sunni tradition (Hanafi, Malaki, Shafi’i, Hanbali) of which 90 percent 
of Muslims around the world belong to. The other 10 percent of Muslims belong to one 
of several Shia traditions (including the Zaydis, Ismailis, and Imamis). See DENNY, supra 
note 2, at 195–215; Bill Powell et. al., Struggle for the Soul of Islam, TIME, Sept. 13, 
2004, at 46. In many ways the early development of Islamic law bears similarities to the 
development of Anglo-American common law. The divine statutes of the Quran and 
Sunnah were interpreted through judicial opinion (ra’y), analogy (qiyas), adoption by 
others (istihsan), and consensus (ijma’). See generally JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC 
LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS (3d ed. 2002); JOHN L. ESPOSITO & NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, 
WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2001); DENNY, supra note 2; DAVID WAINES, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM (1995). 
 16. As Jamal Nasir writes, “From the days of the Prophet, Islam was not just a relig-
ion but a complete code for living, combining the spiritual and the secular, and seeking to 
regulate not only the individual’s relationship with God, but all human social relation-
ships.”  NASIR, supra note 15, at 2. 
 17. For a discussion of the dilemmas faced by religious adherents in the modern state 
and those faced by the state in accommodating religion as an integral part of human 
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ety of Muslims’ critique of Canadian democracy stems from the situa-
tions in which the individual believer or the Muslim community as a 
whole cannot adhere to Islam’s mandates. 
The Canadian Society of Muslims’ critique of and plan to overhaul 
Canadian democracy is laid out in Mumtaz Ali’s 1991 discussion paper, 
Oh! Canada! Whose Land, Whose Dream?.18 Mumtaz Ali’s criticism 
begins with the notion that a key component is missing from Canadian 
democracy, and that component is sovereignty.19 Sovereignty “involves 
the desire to have substantial control over, or play a fundamental role in, 
shaping one’s destiny.”20 Oh! Canada! asserts that white Canadians are 
the only group with sovereignty over their affairs21 and that while de-
mocracy should be based on a social contract, the majority precludes the 
minority from participating fully in the agreement.22 
Oh! Canada! goes on to argue that rights afforded by the government 
are not absolute, but rather, based on a compromise to ensure that com-
peting interests are taken into account on behalf of both the individual 
and the collective.23 Canadian democracy, in order to live up to its ideals, 
must spread the wealth of sovereignty evenly.24 Achieving equality does 
not require everyone to be treated identically but rather requires that no 
                                                                                                                                  
rights law see T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Relig-
ion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003). 
 18. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 2. 
 19. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 12. The discussion of sovereignty begins with a 
discussion of a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court that “denied the land 
claims of a group of Native people” because they had been superceded by the British 
colonial power. Oh! Canada! interprets this decision as saying, “that one source of sover-
eignty has a perfect right to extinguish the sovereignty of another people, and, thereby, 
make any claim for autonomy, on the part of the latter people, null and void.”  Id. 
 20. Id. at 19. 
 21. Id. at 13. Oh! Canada! equates “white” Canadians with “‘mainstream,’ majori-
tarian Canadians or their political representatives” excluding Quebecois and immigrant 
communities. Id. 
 22. Id. at 18. See also JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP (1994). In his 
chapter on Pluralistic Integration, Skinner recognizes the critique that “demands for di-
versity [in the liberal state] . . . have often fallen on deaf ears.” Id. at 79. This critique has 
led some to argue that although liberals may like the idea of “neutral rules,” which treat 
everyone the same, in reality, it does not work this way. Id. Rather, the “most powerful 
group will define the standards of a society’s institutions” and other groups will “have to 
adhere to these standards.”  Id. at 79. 
 23. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 20. 
 24. Id. at 21. See also Iain T. Benson, Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the “Secu-
lar”, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 519–49 (2000) (arguing that liberal society must begin to under-
stand what aspects of faith are necessary to society and then allow religiously informed 
belief to become a part of the public arena). 
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group be given a preference.25 Democracy can offer a spectrum of possi-
bilities for individuals and groups to make choices in line with their own 
needs if they are given the ability to control their affairs internally.26 
In another report of the Canadian Society of Muslims, President Mum-
taz Ali recounts the history of the campaign to create a more suitable en-
vironment for Muslims living in Canada.27 In 1986, the founder of the 
Canadian Society of Muslims, Dr. Baig, submitted a proposal to the On-
tario Courts Inquiry suggesting that Muslim Personal Law28 be taken into 
account in the commission’s study.29 Dr. Baig’s recommendations were 
not adopted and after his death, Syed Mumtaz Ali assumed the leadership 
of the Canadian Society of Muslims.30 
Oh! Canada! includes a detailed plan for constitutional reform,31 elec-
tion reform,32 senate reform,33 and judicial reform.34 The authors use 
French Canadians and the Native peoples35 as examples which illustrate 
                                                                                                                                  
 25. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 22. 
 26. Id. Mumtaz Ali’s criticisms of Canadian democracy are similar to the theories of 
multicultural theorists like Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and Iris Young who argue that 
the so-called neutral institutions of society will always have some bias towards the cul-
tural tradition of the majority. See SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 22–25 (summarizing the 
arguments of early multicultural theorists). 
 27. See Syed Mumtaz Ali, A Word from the President: Campaign up to 1997, Cana-
dian Society of Muslims (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [here-
inafter A Word from the President]. 
 28. Muslim family law and personal status law are used interchangeably. One helpful 
definition of the areas included within personal status law is the one used by the Tunisian 
government: 
Personal Status shall include disputes over the status of the persons and their 
legal capacity, marriage, property dispositions between spouses, mutual rights 
and duties of the spouses, divorce, repudiation and judicial separation, parent-
age, acknowledgement or disavowal of paternity, family and descendants rela-
tionships, maintenance duties among relatives and others, rectification of par-
entage, adoption, tutelage, guardianship, interdiction, attainment of majority, 
gifts, inheritance, wills and other acts taking effect subsequent to death, the ab-
sent person and the declaration of a missing person to be dead. 
Tunisian Presidential Decree of 11/26/1376 AH, 6/26/1957 AD, Raid 51-57-19, art. 2, 
quoted in NASIR, supra note 15, at 30–31. 
 29. See A Word from the President, supra note 27. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 29–33. 
 32. Id. at 10–12. 
 33. Id. at 23–27. 
 34. Id. at 27–29. 
 35. The comparison of the plight of the Native peoples to the problems facing the 
Muslim community is not a convincing comparison. The aboriginal peoples of North 
America and elsewhere were forcibly uprooted from their lands and deprived of their 
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the problems of sovereignty and how they have been addressed within 
Canadian society.36 These examples are then correlated to the problems 
facing the Muslim minority in Canada.37 The authors argue that rather 
than having separation between church and state, those in positions of 
government leadership promote an “anti-religious” rather than a “neu-
tral” perspective.38 This anti-religious perspective conceals animosity 
towards particular religions, such as Islam, and hinders the free exercise 
of religion.39 Public education is one area where these biases become 
evident.40 Another area where Muslims find themselves at a disadvan-
tage, argue Mumtaz Ali and Whitehouse, is in the area of family and per-
sonal status law.41 The authors initially sought to gain official recognition 
                                                                                                                                  
sovereignty by European settlers who saw the Natives’ land as vacant. Aboriginal peo-
ples have been forced to adapt to an uncompromising legal system that ignores their 
viewpoints. See Larissa Behrendt, Cultural Conflict in Colonial Legal Systems: An Aus-
tralian Perspective, in INTERCULTURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 116.  See 
also SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 26 n.42 (noting that theorist Will Kymlicka views minor-
ity nations as having greater claims than religious groups because minority nations are 
entitled to “territorial self-government” whereas religious groups are not); FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 105 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF] (stating that some of the worst acts of 
religious discrimination have been committed against indigenous Canadian peoples). 
 36. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 39. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. See also Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Shar-
ing the Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 389–92 
(2000) (discussing the early multicultural writings that criticized “blindness-to-
difference” policies for their lack of neutrality). 
 39. Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 39. See Ahmad Yousif, Islam, Minorities and Reli-
gious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism, 20 J. MUSLIM MINORITY 
AFF. 1, 32 (2000) (arguing that despite the emphasis on religious freedom and equality in 
the Western liberal state, Christian religions are “more equal” than non-Christian minori-
ties). See also SPINNER, supra note 22. Spinner looks at liberal society and the experi-
ences of several ethnic, racial, and national communities in the United States and Canada 
including two, the Jews and the Amish, which are both ethnic and religious. Spinner dis-
cusses the division of liberal society into the public and private realms and suggests that 
liberal society encourages individuals to keep things like religious identity in the private 
sphere. Id. at 6. Spinner admits that “the demands of liberal citizenship in the public 
sphere and in civil society,” a third realm he identifies in liberal society, “make it hard, 
although not impossible, for liberal citizens to maintain robust ethnic identities.”  Id. 
 40. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 40. Roman Catholic schools remain publicly 
funded because of the carryover of a clause into the Charter from the British North Amer-
ica Act that gave protected status to “denominational, separate or dissentient” schools. 
For a concise explanation and comparison of funding of religious schools among Cana-
dian provinces see FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 35, at 108–09. 
 41. See Oh! Canada!, supra note 6, at 41. Mumtaz Ali and Whitehouse include mar-
riage, divorce, separation, maintenance, child support, and inheritance in personal law. Id. 
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of Muslim personal law in order for the Muslim community to be able to 
regulate this area internally.42  This would allow the Muslim community 
to establish and fund tribunals to settle disputes in the area of personal 
law.43 The logistics for implementing such a plan are detailed in a later 
proposal by Syed Mumtaz Ali.44 Since 2002, however, Mumtaz Ali has 
taken a different approach.45 While it is not clear that Mumtaz Ali has 
abandoned the idea of court-connected tribunals, for now he has opted to 
establish private Muslim arbitration tribunals under the auspices of the 
Ontario Arbitration Act of 199146 that would nonetheless issue court-
enforceable decisions.47 
One area over which the Muslim arbitration tribunals could eventually 
have jurisdiction is divorce.48 While the laws governing Muslim mar-
riage and divorce vary throughout the schools of Islamic law, there are 
several shared principles that will aid in understanding how the tribunals 
will operate and their potential consequences.49 Marriage in Islam is 
                                                                                                                                  
 42. Id. at 43. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Syed Mumtaz Ali, The Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System: The Re-
construction of the Canadian Constitution and the Case for Muslim Personal/Family 
Law, A Submission to the Ontario Civil Justice Review Task Force (Canadian Society of 
Muslims 1994), http://muslim-canada.org/submission.pdf [hereinafter Review of the On-
tario Civil Justice System] (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). See also A Word from the Presi-
dent, supra note 27. 
 45. See Darul Qada, supra note 8. See also Syed Mumtaz Ali, Why Was the Institute 
Formed? (Canadian Society of Muslims 2004), http://muslim-canada.org/IICJ.html [here-
inafter Why Was the Institute Formed?] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 46. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, (Can.), available at http://www.elaws.gov. 
on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en. 
 47. See Darul Qada, supra note 8. According to Mumtaz Ali, 
We will be able to . . . appoint our own Muslim arbitrators and non-Muslim as-
sociate arbitrators to act as ‘private judges’ apply our own Muslim Personal 
Law, including family law (e.g. marriage, khula [divorce initiated by wife or by 
consent of both spouses], divorce, custody, guardianship, mehr [dowry], divi-
sion of property, wills and inheritance, gifts, waqf [charitable trusts], etc.) . . . . 
Arbitrators’ decisions (“awards”) are final in almost all cases. In the event that 
one of the parties [to] arbitration decides to renege on their initial agreement to 
accept and comply with the Arbitration decision, we will be able to enforce 
those arbitration decisions (“awards”) with the help of the Ontario/Canadian 
justice system. 
Id. 
 48. Id. Currently, divorce law is governed by federal law, not Ontario provincial law, 
but establishing jurisdiction over divorce is one of the goals of the Islamic Institute of 
Civil Justice. Id. 
 49. See generally DAWOUD S. EL ALAMI, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW 
(1992) (discussing the variations among the schools of Islamic law). 
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viewed as a contract and, while expected to be permanent, Islam places 
importance on allowing spouses to separate who are unable to live out 
the ideals of marriage.50 The most common form of divorce is known as 
talaq, or repudiation, which gives the husband the right to divorce his 
wife for any reason or no reason.51 In such cases, the husband must pay 
the wife her mahr, or dowry, to which she is entitled.52 Another form of 
divorce is known as khul’, which is initiated by the wife, consented to by 
the husband, and usually requires the wife to sacrifice part or all of her 
dowry.53 By no means comprehensive, these terms will aid in under-
standing not only the Ontario Muslim arbitration tribunals but the ap-
proaches taken in England, Australia, and the United States as well. As 
will be seen below, the Canadian Society of Muslims’ proposal is neither 
the first time a Muslim community has sought to gain recognition of 
Muslim family law in a secular state, nor is Canada the first country to 
confront the dilemmas of a conflict between religious and secular law. 
B. Attempts to Reconcile Secular and Religious Law 
Muslims living in the West have always faced difficulties obtaining 
recognition for Muslim family law.54 Unlike the status of Islamic law in 
predominantly Muslim countries such as in South Asia55 or the Middle 
                                                                                                                                  
 50. See ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 15, at 28. 
 51. See DAWOUD SUDQI EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB WORLD 22 (1996) (providing an overview of Islamic mar-
riage and divorce law before discussing the codified Muslim personal law of the Arab 
world). There are several variations of talaq, some of which are considered more accept-
able such as talaq al-Sunna (divorce in accordance with the teachings and customs of the 
Prophet Muhammad), but the variations all include a unilateral repudiation by the hus-
band that in most cases does not have to be in writing or witnessed. Id. at 23–25. See also 
ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 15, at 27–32. 
 52. See ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 15, at 18–35. 
 53. See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 51, at 27–28; ESPOSITO & DELONG-
BAS, supra note 15, at 32; JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 
78–80 (1990). Another form of divorce by agreement is known as mubaraah, which re-
fers to divorce where both spouses desire to end the marriage. ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, 
supra note 15, at 32. 
 54. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 1998). 
 55. Id. at 51 n.1. Pearl and Menski discuss that Muslim personal law “is the majority 
law in Pakistan and Bangladesh and it also governs a substantial minority in India.”  Id. at 
29. South Asian Muslim law is “a hybrid form of Islamic law . . . with many national and 
regional variations. The authors write, “some of the liveliest jurisprudential debates about 
Muslim law today are conducted in South Asia.”  The authors suggest that the discus-
sions, debates, and difficult questions raised in South Asia “bring with [them] many in-
structive parallels for the development of Muslim law in the West today.”  Id. at 30. In 
the era of European colonization, the European powers applied European law to matters 
of business but left family law to the realm of local custom and religion resulting in a  
216 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:1 
East,56 most Western nations, such as England, Australia, and the United 
States, do not incorporate religion into the legal system. Western states 
have prevented the recognition of Islamic law and have relegated it to the 
private realms of culture.57 Western nations have viewed Islam as incon-
sistent with notions of human rights and have characterized Islam in gen-
eral as opposed to Western values.58 Although this rejection by their 
governments creates tension, many Muslims living in Western nations 
have not or will not abandon Islam or Islamic law.59 
1. English Muslim Law—Angrezi Shariat 
Muslim family law in England is an example of a creative and prag-
matic interplay between Muslim law and the Western state.60 Although, 
the government has been resistant in many ways to accommodate non-
Christian religious traditions,61 it has made some progress in conjunction 
with the creative initiatives of the Muslim community. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the United Kingdom witnessed an influx of Muslim 
                                                                                                                                  
“pluralist family law” in those places with “culturally and religiously diverse popula-
tions.”  Ann Lacquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 
MD. L. REV. 540, 548 (2004). In the case of British colonization, while matters of family 
law were left to the jurisdiction of the religious communities, Britain made use of so-
called repugnancy clauses that reserved to the colonial power the right to not recognize 
certain practices if they were viewed as irreconcilable with “morality, humanity or natu-
ral justice.”  The relics of this system can still be found today in countries such as Kenya 
and India. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 79. 
 56. See generally NASIR, supra note 15. 
 57. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 51. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. See also Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution and Neo-Ijtihad 
in England, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. INT’L REL. 117, 118 (2003), available at 
http://alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/yilmaz.pdf (arguing that non-recognition 
of Islamic law by the state in a predominantly non-Muslim society does not make Islamic 
law disappear) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 60. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 52. 
 61. Education is one realm where the British government continues to resist religious 
accommodation. The Anglican Church remains the state church of England and religious 
education and worship remain a part of state schools. In the Education Reform Act 1988, 
the government reaffirmed its commitment to Christian tradition and teachings in schools 
by requiring religious teaching in schools to “reflect the fact that the religious traditions 
in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and prac-
tices of other principal religions represented in Great Britain.”  Andrew Bainham, Family 
Law in a Pluralistic Society: A View From England and Wales, in FAMILIES ACROSS 
FRONTIERS 301–02 (Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996) (quoting the Education 
Reform Act of 1988). 
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immigrants62 seeking economic and educational opportunities but wish-
ing to retain their religious and cultural practices.63 As the community 
grew in strength and numbers, it began to organize and build institutions 
to protect the interests of the growing Muslim community.64 In 1975, in 
an attempt to demand official recognition of Muslim family law, the Un-
ion of Muslim Organisations (UMO), an association aiming to be the 
representative and lobbying group of Muslims in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland,65 proposed changes to England’s family law.66 The UMO’s 
proposal was very similar to that of Mumtaz Ali’s plan, but failed mis-
erably.67 Although the UMO’s proposal had the support of over 150 
Muslim organizations,68 it did not, however, suggest the establishment of 
                                                                                                                                  
 62. In 1970, there were 300,000 Muslims in Great Britain. By 1987, that number 
grew to 1.5 million. See ANTHONY BRADNEY, RELIGION, RIGHTS AND LAWS 3 (1993). As 
of 2001, there were 1.6 million Muslims comprising three percent of the population and 
more than half of the total non-Christian population. National Statistics, Britain, Reli-
gious Populations (2001), DirectGov, United Kingdom, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/ 
nugget.asp?id=954. 
 63. Manazir Ahsan, The Muslim Family in Britain, in GOD’S LAW VERSUS STATE 
LAW 21 (1995). The overwhelming majority of these immigrants came from India, Paki-
stan, and Bangladesh. Id. at 23. 
 64. Among the institutions built at the time were mosques and Islamic centers, and 
the establishment of movements to increase the availability of Halal food and Islamic 
education. Ahsan also points out that the community grew through British converts to 
Islam. See Ahsan, supra note 63, at 21. 
 65. See ReDirectory of Faith Communities, Union of Muslim Organisations of UK 
and Eire, http://www.theredirectory.org.uk/orgs/umouk.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
The aims of the UMO include “coordinat[ing] the activities of all Muslim organisations 
in the UK and Eire, and to be the representative body of British Muslims in negotiations 
with the British government and other governments and international bodies. The UMO 
has also established a National Muslim Education Council which “offers help to teachers, 
such as guidelines and a syllabus for Islamic education. The UMO offers help to individ-
ual Muslims to practise the tenets of Islam while at work.” Islamic Shari‘a Council, In-
troduction, http://www.islamic-sharia.co.uk/main.html. 
 66. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 58. 
 67. The Islamic Shari‘a Council recognizes this failure on its website in its descrip-
tion of the necessity of the Council. It does not mention the UMO’s proposal by name but 
refers to a proposal fitting its description and states that, “The answer was clear, un-
equivocal: one country, one law!  We have abandoned in our legislation, what was tradi-
tionally known as the Christian view-point, so how can we be expect[ed] to legislate 
according to Islamic Law?” Islamic Shari‘a Council, Preface, http://www.islamic-
sharia.co.uk/preface.html [hereinafter Preface]. 
 68. See Sebastian Poulter, The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law 
for British Muslims, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 147 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors eds., 
1990). Mumtaz Ali does not claim to have the support of any organization beyond the 
organization he leads, the Canadian Society of Muslims, and although it has a rather in-
clusive name, the Society does not appear to represent a significant number of Canadian 
Muslims. See Who We Are, supra note 5. 
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separate Muslim tribunals. The late author Sebastian Poulter, a specialist 
in law relating to ethnic minority traditions in England,69 posits several 
reasons why the UMO’s plan received such a negative reception.70 He 
suggests that the conflict between the English tradition of a unified fam-
ily law and the Muslim desire to incorporate Muslim personal law into 
English law, the conflict between the various schools of Islamic law and 
deciding which one would apply,71 the conflict between the civil courts 
applying religious law or instead a separate religious court,72 and the 
conflict between certain aspects of Muslim family law and various hu-
man rights treaties73 all contributed to the plan’s cold reception. But even 
if the UMO had chosen a particular school of Islamic law, proposed the 
establishment of Muslim arbitration tribunals, and excised all practices of 
gender inequality from Islamic law, it is unlikely that the proposal would 
have had a greater success. As Poulter points out, considering the cen-
trality of the issues and values dealt with in family law, the possibilities 
are remote that English society would accept the complete division of 
family law into religious denominations.74 
Not withstanding this rejection, Muslims have continued to seek rec-
ognition for Muslim family law in England and have made progress. This 
has been evident in the courts and the legislature as well as in the devel-
opment of an ad hoc, extra-legal system known as angrezi shariat, or 
English Muslim law.75 English Muslim law remains unrecognized by the 
state, but this hybrid law, which allows English Muslims to adhere to 
both English and Islamic law, has become a conspicuous and accepted 
                                                                                                                                  
 69. See Notes on the Contributors, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW ix (Chibli Mallat & Jane 
Connors eds., 1990); Contributors, in GOD’S LAW VERSUS STATE LAW viii (Michael King 
ed., 1995). 
 70. See Poulter, supra note 68, at 157. 
 71. See generally DENNY, supra note 2 (describing development of Islamic law and 
the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence). 
 72. Unlike Mumtaz Ali’s proposal, the UMO proposal did not suggest the establish-
ment of separate Islamic courts. 
 73. See Poulter, supra note 68, at 157–64. Treaties potentially implicated by official 
recognition of Muslim family law include the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women. Id. at 160. 
 74. Id. at 158. For a review of marriage law in Great Britain including the Marriage 
Acts 1949 to 1990 see BRADNEY, supra note 62, at 39–58. For a review of the history of 
freedom of worship in England see SEBASTIAN POULTER, ENGLISH LAW AND ETHNIC 
MINORITY CUSTOMS 207–27 (1986). 
 75. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 58. The term angrezi shariat was coined 
by Professors Menski and Pearl. It is a transliteration of Urdu and reflects the South 
Asian majority in the British Muslim community. Id. 
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part of the Muslim community in England.76 The Islamic Shari‘a Council 
has been influential in the establishment of angrezi shariat.77 The Coun-
cil, modeled after the Jewish community’s Beit Din, advises in marital 
disputes and gives guidance on other matters of Muslim family law.78 
The Council also gives expert advice to lawyers and courts and is com-
prised of representatives of the major schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Sparked by the failure of the UMO’s proposal and the sense of alienation 
among some English Muslims, the Council seeks to provide an Islamic 
forum for dealing with the problems and disputes of the Muslim commu-
nity while also increasing acceptance for Islam and Islamic law in the 
West.79 Since its formation in 1982, the Council has presided over 4,500 
cases, over 95 percent of them related to matrimonial problems.80 
The Islamic Shari‘a Council has played an important role in resolving 
the dilemmas that adherence to both English and Islamic law can create 
for English Muslims, particularly in the areas of marriage and divorce. 
For example, a divorce recognized by the civil courts but not Islamic law 
will create a “limping marriage” which is recognized as dissolved by the 
larger community but as still intact by the Muslim community.81 Through 
the Council and other organizations, the Muslim community in England 
                                                                                                                                  
 76. Id. See also Yilmaz, supra note 59, at 118. 
 77. The Islamic Shari‘a Council states its objective as: 
[Advancing] the Islamic Religion by: Fostering and encouraging the practice of 
the Muslim Faith according to the Quran and the Sunnah. Providing advice and 
assistance in the operation of the Muslim family. Establishing a bench to oper-
ate as court of Islamic Shari‘a and to make decisions on matters of Muslim 
Family law referred to it. Doing all such other lawful things as may be in the 
interest of promoting the proper practice of the Muslim faith in the United 
Kingdom. 
Islamic Shari‘a Council, Aims and Objectives, http://www.islamic-sharia.co.uk/main. 
html. 
 78. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 78. Pearl and Menski define the Beit Din 
as “a quasi-judicial body, which regulates the affairs of a large number of British Jews.”  
Id. It should be noted that the Beit Din is a relevant body to orthodox Jews, not the Jewish 
community in general. 
 79. See Preface, supra note 67. 
 80. Of the requests to help resolve matrimonial disputes, the majority come from 
Muslim women seeking a divorce. Islamic Shari‘a Council, How it works?, 
http://www.islamic-sharia.co.uk/works.html [hereinafter How it Works?]; Islamic Shari‘a 
Council, See Who it Represents?, http://www.islamic-sharia.co.uk/represents.html. Those 
wishing to seek the Council’s assistance must register either electronically or by mail and 
pay a registration fee of £60. There are additional fees of £30 if an interview with a 
member of the Council is needed or £60 if a divorce certificate is requested. Islamic 
Shari‘a Council, Forms, www.islamic-sharia.co.uk/forms.html. 
 81. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 78. 
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has created dispute resolution settings that put both civil and religious 
recognition on the same page.82 In the area of divorce, for example, a 
woman whose husband refuses to pronounce talaq, and therefore, pre-
vents the religious dissolution of the marriage, can seek assistance from 
the Council.83 The Council allows both the husband and wife to make 
their case known to the Council and attempts to bring the parties to rec-
onciliation. But if the husband should refuse to respond to the wife’s pe-
tition, the Council will take into account the wife’s position only and 
grant the divorce provided she meets the remaining requirements.84 Re-
solving disputes outside of the British court system has grown in popu-
larity among England’s Muslim community and many non-matrimonial 
disputes appear to be resolved in these extra-legal settings85 without re-
sort to the civil courts.86 
The English legal system has also played an important role in facilitat-
ing the recognition of Islamic culture into the formal legal system.87 In 
several cases, the courts have taken into account the religious practices of 
the parties in making their decisions.88 Additionally, Parliament has 
                                                                                                                                  
 82. Id. See also How it Works?, supra note 80. 
 83. See How it Works?, supra note 80. 
 84. Id. The additional requirements that a wife seeking a divorce must meet include 
having a valid reason for requesting divorce and relinquishing the mahr (gift from hus-
band upon marriage). Id. Since the Council will require a woman seeking a divorce to 
sacrifice her dowry, a woman will potentially receive a better outcome in the civil courts 
where there have been instances of courts awarding women large shares of their dowry 
based on principles of contract and equity. See Werner Menski, Developments in Muslim 
Law: The South Asian Context, 3 S.C.C. (Jour.) 9, 9–10 (2000), available at http://www. 
ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/2000v3a2.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2005); Werner F. 
Menski, Immigration and Multiculturalism in Britain: New Issues in Research and Policy 
4–8 (The Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, University of Manchester, 2002), 
http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/osakalecture.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
See also Islamic Shari‘a Council, Matrimonial Issues: Talaq, http://www.islamic-
sharia.co.uk/talaq.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 85. In the context of divorce, the Islamic Shari‘a Council strongly recommends that 
divorcing couples also go through the civil process of divorce as well, presumably to 
avoid a “limping marriage.” Islamic Shari‘a Council, How it Works?, supra note 80. 
 86. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 79. 
 87. See Sebastian Poulter, Multiculturalism and Human Rights for Muslim Families 
in English Law, in GOD’S LAW VERSUS STATE LAW: THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ISLAMIC 
IDENTITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 81, 82 (Michael King ed., 1995). 
 88. One particularly interesting unreported case is Ali v. Ali (2000), discussed by 
Werner F. Menski in Immigration and Multiculturalism in Britain: New Issues in Re-
search and Policy (The Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, University of Manches-
ter, 2002), available at http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/osakalecture.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005). In this case, two Bangladeshi Muslim professionals residing 
in the UK negotiated a dowry of £30,001. Id. at 6. Not uncommonly, they married under 
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made efforts through legislation that accommodates religious practices 
including laws regarding the ritual slaughter of animals for both Muslims 
and Jews, laws accommodating Sikh men’s wearing of turbans and car-
rying of daggers,89 laws protecting religious dress in school,90 and a law 
seeking to avoid the problem of the limping marriage.91 Legislation such 
as the Children Act of 1989 requires authorities to give consideration to a 
child’s religious persuasion when considering placement in foster 
homes.92 Parliament has also noted the success of the British Muslim 
community in dealing with Islamic divorce. While the House of Lords 
considered the passage of the Religious Marriages Act, a statute not 
unlike the New York law discussed below, to assist in integrating Jewish 
religious and civil divorce, it mentioned that the Council had success-
fully developed its own solution to the problem of limping marriages and 
                                                                                                                                  
both the Islamic and the secular British law. Id. The husband sought a divorce in the Brit-
ish courts and the wife petitioned for her dowry, which the husband refused to pay. Id. 
The High Court judge in London awarded the wife £30,000 (the dowry minus £1). Id. at 
7. Menski, who acted as an Islamic law expert in the case, explained to the judge that he 
must consider the “multicultural scenario” because if he only focused on English law and 
ignored the dowry situation the wife would be driven to a private Shari‘a council and out 
of the public courts. Id. at 6–7. The judge, concerned about the wife seeking relief outside 
of the civil courts, but not willing to fully take into account Islamic law, awarded the wife 
£1 less. Id. at 7. Menski writes, 
By giving her £1 less, he applied not Muslim law, but asserted the application 
of English law, through the English law on equity, with its strong notions of 
justice and fairness. Thus, he not only helped the woman, but also protected 
English law from the unrelenting pressure to accept personal laws, such as that 
of the Muslims, as part of the new British legal framework. The missing £1 is a 
powerful indicator of how close the contest has become, and how well aware of 
this problem the English judges now are. 
Id. at 8. See also Poulter, supra note 87, at 82. Cases discussed by Poulter include Bak-
htiari v. The Zoological Society of London, [1991] 141 N.L.J. 55, and Seemi v. Seemi, 
[1990] 140 N.L.J. 747. 
 89. Bradney quotes the Member of Parliament, Sidney Bidwell, who proposed the bill 
to exempt Sikhs from the Road Traffic Act 1972, which had made it a criminal offense to 
ride a motorcycle without a helmet and forced Sikhs to choose between their religious 
requirement of wearing a turban or forsaking it to ride a motorcycle. MP Bidwell asked, 
“[c]an we seriously say that we are carrying on our tradition of religious tolerance if . . . 
society imposes its will in such a way that a Sikh begins to turn away from his family 
religion . . . . ?”  BRADNEY, supra note 62, at 5. 
 90. See Poulter, supra note 87, at 82. 
 91. Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.). 
 92. Bainham, supra note 61, at 301–02 (citing various sections of the Children Act 
1989). 
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therefore did not require the assistance of this legislation.93 In its final 
form though, the Act, originally intended to apply only to Jewish di-
vorce, included all religious divorces.94 
In the area of Muslim family law, this unrecognized angrezi shariat 
status is interestingly in accordance with the historical development of 
Islamic law, which never regarded family law as a matter for the state.95 
Rather, family and other local disputes were regulated internally by the 
community.96 This internal regulation, akin to ADR, did not involve state 
law or its representatives.97 British Muslims have carried on this tradition 
while also continuing to observe the secular laws of England. 
                                                                                                                                  
 93. See 614 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2000) 115. Lord Lester of Herne Hill de-
scribed the goal of the proposed legislation: 
The Islamic community has sought to resolve problems of “chained” marriages 
by developing its own solutions and a mechanism for a non-consensual divorce, 
and British Muslims argue, according to the books I have read, that tradition-
ally the sphere of family law has not been a matter for state law. The Jewish 
community is not able to deal with the problem without assistance from Par-
liament because of the biblical nature of the get requirements and the absence 
of any rabbinical authority to override those requirements in most circum-
stances . . . . However, it is important to avoid any unfair discrimination against 
the adherents of any religion in our multicultural, plural and democratic soci-
ety. If there are similar problems in relation to other religions, the victims 
should have access to the courts for appropriate relief . . . . As Mr. Singh indi-
cates in his Opinion, the Bill could be amended to deal with any gap in protec-
tion for other religions by empowering the Lord Chancellor to add other relig-
ions by order as appropriate, no doubt after consultations before the order is 
made. 
Id. See also Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.). 
 94. See Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.). The text of the Act 
demonstrate its universal applicability: 
This section applies if a decree of divorce has been granted but not made abso-
lute and the parties to the marriage concerned—(a) were married in accordance 
with—(i) the usages of the Jews, or (ii) any other prescribed religious usages; 
and (b) must co-operate if the marriage is to be dissolved in accordance with 
those usages. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 95. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 54, at 71. Modern states, which officially recognize 
Muslim personal law have attempted to take control over family law. Examples of coun-
tries that recognize Muslim personal law and have attempted to regulate it include Paki-
stan and Bangladesh. This recognition has led to clashes between the “state-sponsored 
codified Muslim personal law” and “the traditional shari‘a rules.”  But, nonetheless, Pearl 
and Menski argue that “mutual non-recognition” between the Muslim community and 
Western legal centralists “is not a viable option from either perspective.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 72. 
 97. Id. at 72 n.70. 
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2. Australia’s Rule of Non-Recognition 
The Muslim community in Australia remains small, but ever growing. 
While the total number of non-Christians was reported to be only 2.6 
percent of the population in 1991, that number continues to increase due 
to burgeoning immigration trends.98 The 2001 census reported a record 
number of 281,576 Muslims in Australia with more than one-third of 
those native-born Australians and an increase of approximately 40 per-
cent over five years.99 In response to the changes, particularly through 
immigration, then Prime Minister Bob Hawke instituted a National 
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia in 1989.100 This agenda included a 
focus on the right of all Australians to express their cultural identity 
through religion.101 While the agenda centered on the individual right to 
express one’s cultural identity, it also emphasized a commitment to Aus-
tralian unity and the principles of democracy and individual rights, in-
cluding gender equality.102 
Since employing this strategy, Australia has made a start towards ac-
commodating aboriginal marriages. These reforms could be extended to 
religious marriages as well, but have not been to date. The aboriginal 
reforms came about as a result of the Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion’s task of considering how a range of laws could better accommodate 
cultural diversity.103 In response to the Commission’s work, the Austra-
lian government has employed a rule of non-recognition.104 The rule of 
non-recognition operates in the legal sense that aborigines may marry 
outside of the Australian Marriage Act of 1961 but still obtain societal 
recognition and an expectation of permanency. The benefit of the rule of 
non-recognition is that it allows aborigines to marry without the imposi-
                                                                                                                                  
 98. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 35, at 167. 
 99. See Australia Now, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/islam_in_australia.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
 100. SEBASTIAN POULTER, ETHNICITY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 383 (1998). See Na-
tional Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, 1989 Report, Australian Government, De-
partment of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, http://www.immi. 
gov.au/multicultural/_inc/publications/agenda/agenda89/toc.htm. 
 101. POULTER, supra note 100, at 384. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The Commission was asked to report on criminal law, family law, and contract 
law. Id. 
 104. See Patrick Parkinson, Multiculturalism and the Regulation of Marital Status in 
Australia, in FAMILIES ACROSS FRONTIERS 309, 311 (Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 
1996). See also Patrick Parkinson, Taking Multiculturalism Seriously: Marriage Law and 
the Rights of Minorities, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 473, 480 (1994) (discussing the Australian 
Law Reform Commission’s choice that non-recognition would be the best means for 
respecting indigenous culture). 
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tion of the “western legal and cultural framework” and exempts them 
from the strictures of the laws of divorce, which have no aboriginal 
equivalent.105 Moreover, the State is exempt from codifying aboriginal 
customs that may conflict with western legal norms and thus not conflict 
with the National Agenda’s commitment to Australia’s democratic 
norms.106 Australia recognizes certain exceptions to the rule of non-
recognition through government acts, which protect various interests, 
among them family interests including those of children, decedent’s 
property, the ability to adopt, and spouses of government employees.107 
Patrick Parkinson, Professor of Law and specialist in family law at the 
University of Sydney, suggests that the rule of non-recognition be ex-
tended to all marriages performed by ethnic or religious communities.108 
Legal regulation of marriage should be kept at the minimum necessary to 
protect the human rights of individuals.109 Principles intrinsic to the 
western legal tradition and recognized as human rights by the interna-
tional community should not be compromised.110 In 1992, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission agreed with Professor Parkinson and recom-
mended that Australian law should be more receptive to its multicultural 
society,111 but the Commission has failed to implement its recommenda-
tions.112 
On the subject of divorce, while the Commission was willing to recog-
nize customary marriages, it was not willing to extend that recognition to 
divorce. Parkinson argues that while this stance was justified because of 
the public interest in allowing time for reconsideration and reconcilia-
tion, as well as an interest in the welfare of children, an attempt at com-
promise could have been reached.113 One such compromise would con-
tinue to require the requisite time of separation subject to consideration 
                                                                                                                                  
 105. Parkinson, supra note 104, at 480. 
 106. Id. See also POULTER, supra note 100, at 384. 
 107. See Parkinson, supra note 104, at 480 n.36. 
 108. Id. at 480–81. 
 109. Id. (discussing the treaties to which Australia is a party which govern the protec-
tion of individuals with regards to marriage including the Convention on Consent to Mar-
riage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage and Article 23 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
 110. Id. at 484. For a comparison of the laws protecting individual rights in England, 
Australia, and the United States see PETER W. EDGE, LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS 
DIFFERENCE 75–108 (2002). 
 111. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 35, at 168. 
 112. See Parkinson, supra note 104, at 484. As of 1992, Australian family law applies 
to all residents including those in Australian territories in the Indian Ocean, which for-
merly applied Muslim personal law. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, supra note 35, at 
168. 
 113. See Parkinson, supra note 104, at 486–87. 
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of the welfare of the children but without the usual filing requirements. 
The government would ensure that these procedures would be open to 
men and women in order to guarantee that customs not in line with gen-
der equality would not prevent a spouse from seeking a divorce on the 
basis of their gender. The government would allow parties of a custom-
ary divorce to seek a civil declaration of dissolution if they wish.114  Such 
an approach does not really seem, on its face, like much of a compro-
mise. It seems to retain the government’s requirements while only doing 
away with some filing requirements. The public’s interest in the welfare 
of children and the rights of both men and women to dissolve a marriage 
seem to warrant the close governmental oversight here, and perhaps 
Parkinson’s approach is mindful of that. 
The Australian Commission, like the English Parliament and the New 
York legislature, also responded to the question of whether the civil law 
should require a party to grant a religious divorce before being granted a 
civil divorce. The Commission recommended that a court could use its 
power to postpone the finality of a divorce decree until the impediment 
to religious divorce had been removed unless a child would be harmed in 
the process.115 This stance took the concerns of minority groups seriously 
and Parkinson suggests that concerns about women being denied the 
right to divorce and remarry may have prompted this multicultural rec-
ommendation.116 
In reflection, Parkinson questions whether a society deeply rooted in 
traditions of European law is willing to go beyond passing anti-
discrimination laws or providing multilingual court interpreters as a 
means of implementing multiculturalism. He questions whether true mul-
ticulturalism is even possible without the willingness to consider ways to 
allow minority groups to utilize their own set of laws without compro-
mising individual freedoms.117 This question is at the heart of the deci-
sion facing Canada in its consideration of the Canadian Society of Mus-
lims’ proposal. 
                                                                                                                                  
 114. Id. at 487. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. This recommendation mainly affects Jewish and Muslim divorces. Both Jew-
ish and Muslim divorce law allows for the unilateral repudiation of a wife by her hus-
band. Under Jewish law, a husband must give a written document called a get to his wife 
to enable her to remarry. Under Islamic law, a husband must pronounce a verbal declara-
tion called talaq releasing his wife in order for her to remarry. See Judith Romney 
Wegner, The Status of Women in Jewish and Islamic Marriage and Divorce Law, 5 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 16 (1982). 
 117. See Parkinson, supra note 104, at 505. 
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3. The United States—The Melting Pot Goes Multicultural 
The United States, a nation of immigrants, has maintained a fiercely 
uniform, if not secular, family law,118 traditionally allowing little room 
for cultural accommodation. In the past forty years, however, as immi-
gration trends have shifted away from Europe and expanded to include 
more immigrants from Asia, Africa, and South America, the needs of 
these immigrants have forced the American legal system, as well as soci-
ety in general, to find practical ways of accommodating their needs.119 
While the challenges of developing a multicultural family law remain, 
there is evidence that courts are beginning to take into account the needs 
                                                                                                                                  
 118. However, the roots of American family law, particularly those laws involving 
marriage, are heavily influenced by Christian tradition. Estin, supra note 55, at 542–43. 
An alternative to the extreme separation, or rather the imposed secularist approach of 
religious freedom in states such as the United Kingdom and United States is the “millet 
system” that operated in the Ottoman Empire. See KYMLICKA, supra note 1, at 156. The 
millet system allowed Muslims, Christians, and Jews the ability to self-govern, impose 
religious laws on members of their respective communities, establish religious courts, 
and subdivide for ethnic or linguistic convenience. Id. The Empire recognized and en-
forced individual groups’ decisions and rules on matters of family law but also strictly 
regulated non-Muslim communities’ interactions with Muslims. These restrictions in-
cluded a rule against proselytizing for non-Muslims, a rule requiring licenses for building 
churches, and a rule requiring non-Muslims to pay special taxes. The disadvantage of this 
system, because of its lack of recognition for individual rights, was its inability to allow 
for or protect dissent within each religious community. Id. at 157. The system allowed 
each group to suppress individual dissent and define the terms of membership as it saw fit 
which could severely impact an individual’s civil status. In the mid-eighteenth century, 
the millets lost much of their self-governing authority when the Ottomans began to prefer 
a more unified citizenship. Id. at 183. Israel, a Jewish and democratic state, with a diverse 
religious population both within its Jewish population and among its various minority 
groups, employs a modified version of the millet system. This system delegates many 
personal status issues to religious authorities.  A compromise reached between secular 
and religious Jews during the founding of the State of Israel delegated the regulation of 
personal status issues to the orthodox rabbinate. Today, Israeli Jews seeking to marry 
under the Reform, Conservative, or Reconstructionist streams of Judaism or civilly find 
themselves unable to gain official state recognition of their marriages because the ortho-
dox rabbinate does not recognize these marriages. Jews wishing to marry outside of the 
orthodox tradition must marry outside of Israel. See Michael Corinaldi, Protecting Mi-
nority Cultures and Religions in Matters of Personal Status both within State Boundaries 
and beyond State Frontiers—the Israeli System, in FAMILIES ACROSS FRONTIERS 385–94 
(Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996) (describing the legal status of religion in 
Israel particularly the personal status of internal Jewish minorities). See also Melanie D. 
Reed, Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The Application of Shari‘a in a Mod-
ern World, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 485, 497–503 (2004) (discussing the jurisdiction of 
religious courts in Israel). 
 119. See generally Estin, supra note 55. 
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of its citizens.120 In the legislatures, New York has taken the lead in pass-
ing an innovative yet controversial law,121 predominantly accommodat-
ing the needs of its Jewish residents to obtain a divorce, but also able to 
serve the needs of Muslims and those of other faiths.122 Additionally, as 
in England, the Muslim community has used creativity and pragmatism 
to develop its own mechanisms for balancing religious and secular 
law.123 
The New York Get Law, as it is known because of its intent to remedy 
the intentional withholding of Jewish religious divorces by husbands,124 
accommodates religious tradition while also protecting individual liber-
ties. Jewish law requires a husband to serve a document, the get, to his 
wife in order for the marriage to be dissolved.125 With a civil decree and 
no get, a Jewish woman faces a limping marriage, unrecognized by the 
                                                                                                                                  
 120. One regularly cited case is Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 2002) where a Muslim marriage contract was treated like any other contract and the 
court required the husband to pay the wife the dowry owed her. See discussion of case in 
Estin, supra note 55, at 573 and Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A 
Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC 
FAMILY LAW 201 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004). In Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, 1995 
WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), the court acknowledged the existence of Muslim mar-
riage contract but refused to enforce it because of vagueness not because it was a reli-
gious agreement. Id. at 203. 
 121. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). It has been argued that this law is 
unconstitutional because it violates the protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, and while it has been found unconstitutional as applied in a New York trial 
court, see Chambers v. Chambers, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), it has not yet 
been found to violate the U.S. Constitution. While it is beyond the scope of this Note to 
consider the constitutional questions surrounding this legislation, this Note offers the 
legislation as a practical compromise between religious and civil law. For an analysis of 
the First Amendment issues implicated by this legislation see Kent Greenawalt, Religious 
Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious 
Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781 (arguing that the New York Get Law is constitu-
tional); cf. Patti A. Scott, Comment, New York Divorce Law and the Religion Clauses: An 
Unconstitutional Exorcism of the Jewish Get Laws, 6 SETON HALL CONST L.J. 1117 
(1996) (arguing that the New York Get Law is unconstitutional). 
 122. Because of the similarities between Jewish and Islamic divorce, particularly be-
tween the get and talaq, the New York Get Law is easily applicable to protect Muslims. 
See Wegner, supra note 116; Bernard Berkovits, Get and Talaq in English Law: Reflec-
tions on Law and Policy 119–25 in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors 
eds., 1990). 
 123. See generally Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 120, at 177–229; YVONNE 
YAZBECK HADDAD & ADAIR T. LUMMIS, ISLAMIC VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); 
EARLE H. WAUGH, BAHA ABU-LABAN & REGULA B. QURESHI, THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
IN NORTH AMERICA (1983). 
 124. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). 
 125. See ISAAC KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (2d ed. 1992). 
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Jewish community.126 The New York Get Law requires a party married 
by any clergy seeking a divorce to verify that no barriers to the defen-
dant’s remarriage exist “to the best of his or her knowledge” by the time 
final judgment is entered by the court.127 The law does not involve the 
clergy in the divorce proceedings. Rather, it is the plaintiff who attests 
that a barrier to remarriage does not exist.128 The verification is made by 
a sworn statement, and a party knowingly making a false statement can 
be prosecuted under the penal law.129 Under Jewish law, a get must be 
given voluntarily and a get given under coercion or duress will be 
deemed inadequate. To oblige this religious requirement, the Get Law 
defines a “barrier to remarriage” as only those things that can be rectified 
voluntarily by the spouse.130 A drawback of the legislation is that it is 
only the plaintiff who must swear there is no barrier to the defendant’s 
remarriage.131 In practical terms, the law works as it should when the 
husband attempts to extort the wife by seeking a civil divorce and refuses 
to deliver the get, but does not work when the wife seeks a civil divorce 
and the husband refuses to deliver the get. However, this is something 
that could be remedied through further amendments.132 
Despite the controversial nature of the New York Get Law, it serves as 
an apt illustration of a compromise between competing religious and 
civil interests. The law recognizes the indispensability of religious law 
for some persons while preserving the state’s interest in marriage and the 
ability of adults to marry freely. It acknowledges the centrality of matri-
monial issues to religious life and the tension facing religious individuals 
when trying to harmonize religious and secular law.133 At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                  
 126. For a brief description of the get procedure including the historical basis see 
Berkovits, supra note 122, at 119–25. For additional brief descriptions see also Wegner, 
supra note 116; Michael Freeman, Law, Religion and the State, in FAMILIES ACROSS 
FRONTIERS 361 (Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996). 
 127. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). Because the law does not specifi-
cally refer to any religious group, it has the ability to include Islamic divorce as well as 
any other religious divorces. Id. 
 128. See Greenawalt, supra note 121, at 799 (discussing the constitutional implications 
of entanglement when religious officials become involved with a legislative scheme in 
the context of kosher laws). 
 129. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). 
 130. Id. This greatly assisted in helping the law be accepted by the orthodox Jewish 
Community. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Amendments made thus far to the law include a 1984 amendment eliminating the 
requirement that a spouse consult with clergy for an opinion on whether a “barrier to 
remarriage” existed. Id. 
 133. See SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 78. Such laws as the New York Get Law actually 
have “expanded the power of state law over minority cultures by creating a formal link 
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it provides a civil protection for women who may find themselves at the 
mercy of religious law when a husband refuses to serve a get upon his 
wife. It both protects the free exercise of religion while protecting against 
the abuse of a religious law that can infringe fundamental individual lib-
erties. 
In addition to encouraging courts to take into account religious law and 
practice, the American Muslim community134 has used its initiative to 
incorporate and balance its religious law with the secular laws of the 
United States.135 Some Muslims have encouraged the use of expanded 
marriage contracts to include certain religious obligations.136 Like Mus-
lims in England and Canada, some American Muslims have considered 
the idea of establishing alternative dispute resolution fora for Muslims.137 
The initiatives in the United States, however, have considered utilizing a 
more egalitarian approach than has been implemented in England. In the 
United States, the emphasis might focus not so much on the arbitrator’s 
decision, but rather on conflict resolution through greater involvement of 
                                                                                                                                  
between the civil proceedings of divorce and the removal of all religious or customary 
barriers to remarriage” but such laws are “nevertheless . . . important because [they pro-
vide] formal recognition of certain aspects of minority communities’ family law tradi-
tions.”  Id. at 77–78. 
 134. The American Muslim community has been estimated to be between 1–7 million 
and its numbers are difficult to verify. See, e.g., EGON MAYER, ET AL., CITY UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 13 (2001), 
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_studies/aris.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (es-
timating 1.1 million American Muslims); TOM W. SMITH, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, 
ESTIMATING THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), http://www.ajc.org/ 
site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846733&ct=1044159 (last visited Oct. 9, 
2005) (estimating 1.8 million American Muslims); IHSAN BAGBY, ET AL., COUNCIL ON 
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE MOSQUE IN AMERICA: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 
(2001), http://www.cairnet.org/mosquereport/Masjid_Study_Project_2000_Report.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (estimating 6–7 million American Muslims). American 
mosques are very ethnically diverse including Americans of South Asian, African, and 
Arab ancestry. Ninety-three percent of American mosques include a broad range of eth-
nic diversity. Id. 
 135. See generally Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 120, at 176–229. 
 136. Among them is lawyer, professor, and founder of the civil rights advocacy group, 
Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights, Azizah Al-Hibri, who advocates 
the use of marriage contracts and asserts that principles of Muslim marriage law have 
been misinterpreted and actually serve to promote and protect women’s rights. Id. at 184. 
See generally http://www.karamah.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (describing the work 
and initiatives of Azizah Al-Hibri and Karamah). 
 137. Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 120, at 214–15. The alternative dispute reso-
lution forum, the beit din, utilized by the orthodox Jewish community, has influenced 
these initiatives. Id. at 215. 
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the parties and community members.138 In addition, some states have 
enacted laws that include clergy on lists of available mediators and fam-
ily counselors.139 Despite recent setbacks, most notably through assaults 
on their communities post-September 11th, 2001,140 the experience of 
Muslims in America has been positive and has included, quite vocally, 
the voices of women along with men.141 This community has and will 
continue to use the tools of democratic society to organize and move 
forward, unhindered by the narrow, male-dominated interpretations of 
Islam that prevailed in the past.142 
III. THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CANADA 
In 1970, Canada’s multiculturalism policy shifted and it began favor-
ing ‘polyethnicity’143 over assimilation for immigrants.144 However, it 
was not until 1982 that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms not only 
codified fundamental freedoms but also adopted a rule that required the 
newly drafted Charter to be interpreted in accordance with the multicul-
tural heritage of Canadians.145 Since the Charter’s adoption, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has had a few occasions to consider the meaning of 
freedom of religion as laid out in the Charter.146 
                                                                                                                                  
 138. Id. Quraishi and Syeed-Miller suggest that the existence of established arbiters 
might be welcomed by some courts and cite a case from California in which the parties 
agreed to consult two religious scholars who made a recommendation that was then used 
by the judge to allocate the spouses’ property. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Moni Basu, In Troubled Times, U.S. Muslims Get Political, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., July 24, 2004, at A1; Raksha Varma, ACLU Has Hotline for Arabs, Muslims 
Visited by FBI, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at 26. 
 141. Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 120, at 217. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See KYMLICKA, supra note 1, at 17. Kymlicka defines “polyethnic rights” as 
“group-specific measures . . . intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities 
express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the 
economic and political institutions of the dominant society.”  Id. at 31. 
 144. A policy of polyethnicity prefers integration over self-government. Id. at 31. 
 145. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 27, as 
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44, sched. B, Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), ch. 11, Pt. I (Appendix II 
1985), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html [hereinafter Charter]. 
 146. For a critique of the Canadian Supreme Court’s interpretation of religious free-
dom, see John Von Heyking, The Harmonization of Heaven and Earth? Religion, Poli-
tics, and Law in Canada, 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 663–97 (2000) (arguing that the Court has 
confused religious pluralism with secularism). 
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes “freedom of 
conscience and religion” as among the fundamental freedoms,147 but 
even these fundamental freedoms are subject to reasonable limits.148 
Unlike the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Cana-
dian Charter does not include an establishment clause. The Charter pro-
vides for free exercise for individuals without prohibiting the govern-
ment’s actions.149 Thus, the Charter does not prohibit selective funding of 
religious schools.150 Additionally, the Charter has other provisions to be 
considered in conjunction with freedom of religion. These include the 
preamble’s reference to the supremacy of God151 and Section 27, which 
requires the Charter to be interpreted in a multicultural manner.152 
The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the Charter’s meaning of re-
ligious freedom in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., a case about a law that 
enforced a Christian day of rest.153 In declaring the Lord’s Day Act un-
constitutional, the Court found that the coercive law was antithetical to 
                                                                                                                                  
 147. Charter, pt. I, § 2 (“2. Fundamental Freedoms. Everyone has the following fun-
damental freedoms: a) freedom of conscience and religion; b) freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communica-
tion; c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and d) freedom of association.”). 
 148. Id. pt. I, § 1 (“1. Rights and freedoms in Canada. The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such rea-
sonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.”). See also Paul Horwitz, The Source and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a 
Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing 
that religious freedom allows for the practice of essential religious practices and those 
practices considered unessential may not be protected under the Charter). 
 149. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion, Ex-
pression, and Association in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 20 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 577, 582–83 (1988). 
 150. Id. at 583. See also R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 295, 303 (“Sec-
tion 29 preserves the rights of denominational schools guaranteed under s. 93 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867: 29. Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or 
privileges guaranteed by or under this Constitution of Canada in respect of denomina-
tional, separate or dissentient schools.”). See also Horwitz, supra note 148 (discussing the 
lack of a “firm wall” between church and state in Canada). 
 151. Charter, pt. I, pmbl. 
 152. Id. pt. I, § 27. See also Big M Drug Mart, [1984] 1 S.C.R. at 302 (“Section 27 
makes the multicultural heritage of Canada an interpretive guideline for the Charter.”). 
But see JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF 
DIVERSITY 7 (1995) (arguing that the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has actually encouraged discord and that so-called “culture-blind liberal consti-
tutionalism” is not the solution for meeting the needs of cultural diversity). 
 153. Big M Drug Mart, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 295. In this case, Big M was charged with 
violating the Lord’s Day Act. The Lord’s Day Act prohibited work on Sundays and pun-
ished a violation as a criminal offense. Id. 
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the demands of a free society.154 The Court listed the principles essential 
to freedom of religion, including the rights to entertain, declare, and 
manifest religious beliefs.155 These freedoms are limited by the state’s 
interest in protecting the public, including the guarantee that one per-
son’s freedom will not infringe on another’s.156 Besides creating an un-
welcoming environment for non-Christians and infringing upon the right 
to engage in otherwise lawful activity, the Court recognized the inconsis-
tency of the Lord’s Day Act with Section 27 of the Charter157 by “[com-
pelling a] universal observance of the day of rest preferred by one relig-
ion.”158 In response to the Government’s argument that the Charter, 
unlike the U.S. Constitution, does not have an anti-establishment princi-
ple, the Court found that the guarantee of Section 2(a) does not depend 
upon such a principle and required that laws alleged to interfere with the 
freedom of religion would be judged on a case-by-case basis.159 
IV. COURT REFORM IN CANADA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Court Reform Recommendations & Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In 1987, the Ontario Courts Inquiry, presided over by the Honorable 
Thomas G. Zuber, sought to recommend changes to the civil court sys-
                                                                                                                                  
 154. Id. “Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or con-
straint.”  Id. at 336. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 336–37. 
 157. Mordechai Wasserman describes the rights and freedoms in the Charter as nega-
tive rights, which place limits on government, and quotes Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in 
Young v. Young, who wrote that the purpose of the Charter is “to provide a measure of 
protection from the coercive power of the state and a mechanism of review to persons 
who find themselves unjustly burdened or affected by the actions of government.”  
Wasserman says that section 27 “is an interpretive section that gives direction to courts 
for interpreting the rights and freedoms in the Charter, and does not mandate anything 
about the role of the state.”  Mordechai Wasserman, Review of J. Syrtash, Religion and 
Culture in Canadian Family Law, 12 CAN. J. FAM. L. 215 (1994) (reviewing JOHN TIBOR 
SYRTASH, RELIGION AND CULTURE IN CANADIAN FAMILY LAW (1992)). 
 158. Big M Drug Mart, [1984] 1 S.C.R. at 337. 
 159. Id. at 341. See also Sedler, supra note 149, at 582–83 (arguing that the expansive 
meaning given freedom of religion in this case shows that the Canadian government must 
remain neutral toward religion). Sedler also discusses R. v. Edwards and Books and Art, 
Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 744–47, where a Sunday closing law was upheld because of its 
secular purpose, similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599 (1961). Id. at 587. 
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tem in Ontario due to the increasing workload the system faced.160 The 
Zuber Commission, as the Inquiry came to be known, was the precursor 
to the Ontario Civil Justice Review. Recommendations of this commis-
sion included establishing a permanent and separate family court in On-
tario and incorporating more ADR into the overburdened court system.161 
With respect to family law cases, it suggested that the court give spouses 
the opportunity to request mediation at the very beginning of the court 
dispute.162 It did not mention the incorporation of Muslim personal law. 
In April 1994, the then Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice 
and the then Attorney General of Ontario established a commission 
called the Civil Justice Review to once again review the problems facing 
the civil justice system in Ontario.163 The Civil Justice Review’s First 
Report described the Ontario justice system as “an administrative mon-
ster that muddles along at best”164 and one in which the public is de-
manding greater participation.165 One of the commission’s recommenda-
tions sought to create a vision of the courts as a “dispute resolution cen-
tre” utilizing a multi-door approach.166 The multi-door approach would 
allow disputants to choose from a variety of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms that would be geared toward their particular circumstances while 
                                                                                                                                  
 160. HON. T.G. ZUBER, REPORT OF THE ONTARIO COURTS INQUIRY 1–7 (1987) [herein-
after ZUBER COMMISSION]. The Commission mandated: 
[T]he Honourable Thomas George Zuber . . . be authorized to inquire into and 
requested to report by April 1, 1987 on the jurisdiction, structure, organization, 
sittings, case scheduling and workload of all of the courts of Ontario, and any 
other matter affecting the accessibility of and the service to the public provided 
by the courts of Ontario, and to make recommendations to the Attorney Gen-
eral concerning the provision of a simpler, more convenient more expeditious 
and less costly system of courts for the benefit of the people of Ontario. 
Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. § 12.2, Summary of Recommendations. 
 162. Id. at 289. 
 163. See CIVIL JUSTICE REVIEW, FIRST REPORT 3 (March 1995) [hereinafter FIRST 
REPORT]. The mandate of the Civil Justice Review is “to develop an overall strategy for 
the civil justice system in an effort to provide a speedier, more streamlined and more 
efficient structure which will maximize the utilization of public resources allocated to 
civil justice.”  Id. 
 164. Id. at 99. 
 165. Id. at 102. 
 166. Id. at 7. Similarly, in the realm of family law, the Children of Separation & Di-
vorce Center (COSD), a non-profit organization in Maryland, has referred to the ap-
proach of their dispute resolution center as a “cafeteria-style” approach including access 
to services such as case evaluation, community referral, counseling, child access plan-
ning, expert consultation, property and support mediation, and arbitration. Patricia Gear-
ity, ADR and Collaborative Lawyering in Family Law, 35 MD. B.J., June 2002, at 2, 6. 
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assuring that the mechanisms would remain “impartial and fair” and re-
solve disputes in a binding manner.167 The commission emphasized that 
although ADR techniques present alternatives to disputants, they are not 
intended to replace the court system.168 In reviewing the types of ADR, 
binding arbitration is suggested among the possible alternatives.169 The 
commission recommended that access to ADR be court-connected170 be-
cause the state has an obligation to make dispute resolution available to 
the public and because ADR fits within the commission’s goal of more 
effective caseflow management.171 A court-connected ADR pilot project 
was launched in Ontario in October 1994.172 
After the implementation of the ADR pilot project, the Supplementary 
Report of the Civil Justice Review reaffirmed its commitment to court-
connected ADR.173 One evaluation of the pilot project suggested that the 
positive responses to the project were a result of the project’s court-
connectedness, ensuring that supervision by the Court enhances ADR’s 
credibility in the eyes of the public.174  In the area of family law, the 
                                                                                                                                  
 167. FIRST REPORT, supra note 163, at 8. 
 168. Id. at 210. 
 169. Id. at 213–14. The Law Society of Upper Canada published the Glossary of Dis-
pute Resolution Processes that sets forth definitions of various ADR terms. The Glossary 
defines “arbitration” as: 
Any of the forms of dispute resolution involving a mutually acceptable, neutral 
third party making a decision on the merits of the case, after an informal hear-
ing which usually includes the presentation of evidence and oral argument. The 
process has four main variations (creating numerous permutations): binding or 
non-binding; voluntary or compulsory; private, statute-authorized, court an-
nexed (alternatively termed court-connected); one arbitrator or a panel. 
THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, GLOSSARY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
(1992), reprinted in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 767 (Julie Macfarlane ed., 2d ed. 2003). In its 
definition of “binding arbitration” the Glossary notes that a decision is subject to judicial 
review only in limited circumstances. The Glossary defines decisions rendered through 
‘mandatory court-annexed arbitration’ as non-binding if any party disputes them and that 
unsatisfied parties retain the right to proceed to trial with some cost penalty attached. Id. 
Under Mumtaz Ali’s proposed plan, parties would not retain this right. See Review of the 
Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44, at 39–41. 
 170. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 163, at 214. “Court-connected” meaning that 
“ADR facilities should be available to the public as part of the ‘court’ system.”  Id. 
 171. Id. at 215 (“Caseflow management” is “a case-processing mechanism which man-
ages the time and events of a lawsuit as it passes through the justice system.”). A court-
connected ADR pilot project was launched in Ontario in October 1994. The pilot project 
excluded family law matters. Id. at 216. 
 172. Id. at 216. 
 173. See CIVIL JUSTICE REVIEW, SUPPLEMENTAL AND FINAL REPORT 50 (Nov. 1996) 
[hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL AND FINAL REPORT]. 
 174. Id. at 61–62. 
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commission recognized that family disputes might be ripe for the use of 
ADR, but also recognized that in some circumstances family disputes 
could create an imbalance in the process and preclude those particular 
disputes from utilizing ADR.175 Considering the potential for such imbal-
ances, the commission recommended two modified opportunities for 
ADR in the context of family law.176 The first involved the creation of 
centers to educate the public about court proceedings and ADR resources 
available in the area of family law.177 The second involved family law 
case conferences held before a judge shortly after the filing of a claim.178 
These conferences would establish a strategy for case management and 
consider whether mediation, not arbitration, might help resolve the dis-
pute. The judge would play a greater supervisory role because of the 
“heightened importance” of the legal rights involved in family disputes 
and the potential impact of decisions on children.179 
B. ADR and Family Law: Practical Concerns 
The elevated concern that the Civil Justice Review had for the applica-
tion of ADR to family disputes is not surprising considering that family 
law serves several important social functions180 and that the concerns 
expressed by the Civil Justice Review regarding the gravity of family 
disputes has been considered by practitioners and scholars of family law 
alike. While both practitioners and scholars have concerns about the im-
pact of ADR on family disputes, in particular those involving custody 
and domestic violence, most do not rule out the use of ADR in family 
disputes. Many recognize that the traditional adversarial model of litiga-
tion may actually do more harm than good to the children involved in 
                                                                                                                                  
 175. Id. at 77. These situations include cases of  “acrimony between the parties, and 
the presence of spousal abuse problems and power imbalances.”  Id. 
 176. Id. at 77–78. 
 177. Id. at 77. 
 178. Id. at 78. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).  Professor Schneider sees Family Law as serving five main 
functions in society: the protective function, the facilitative function, the arbitral function, 
the expressive function, and the channeling function. The channeling function “creates or 
(more often) supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable ends.”  Id. at 
498. Examples given by Schneider are marriage and parenthood. The channeling function 
serves the other functions of family law and while it may have both positive and negative 
effects on society, Schneider concludes that it will not disappear because society will 
continue to create, depend upon, and improve social institutions. Id. 
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these disputes.181 A trend to establish a more collaborative model of deal-
ing with family disputes that focuses on settlement rather than litigation 
has been recognized by practitioners in both Canada and the United 
States.182 Proponents of the use of ADR for resolving family disputes do 
not necessarily advocate, however, that ADR for family disputes be rele-
gated to the private sphere without the scrutiny of the public system.183 
While family law deals with issues of heightened importance like cus-
tody and domestic violence, it also serves important social functions for 
various groups. For minority groups, such as Muslims living in Canada, 
family law, governing many personal status issues, plays a key role in 
determining identity.184 It is through family law that one’s membership in 
the community is decided.185 While determining membership is directly 
related to a group’s survival, public policy concerns, such as women’s 
equality, challenge the degree to which secular states are willing to dele-
gate such matters.186 In the development of collective identities, while 
women have on the one hand been revered, their reverence has also 
given way to “gender-biased norms and practices that often subordinate 
women.”187 Accommodation of cultural differences in the realm of fam-
ily law can help protect the survival of minority communities, but it can 
also reinforce discriminatory cultural practices that impact those minori-
ties within the minority, such as women.188 Viable ways to incorporate 
                                                                                                                                  
 181. See generally Eileen Pruett & Cynthia Savage, Statewide Initiatives to Encourage 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Enhance Collaborative Approaches to Resolving 
Family Issues, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 232 (2004); Gearity, supra note 166; Gregory Firestone 
& Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adver-
sarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203 (2004). 
 182. See Julien D. Payne, Professor, Presentation to students in the Faculty of Law, 
University of Saskatchewan, Family Conflict Management and Family Dispute Resolu-
tion on Marriage Breakdown and Divorce: Diverse Options (Feb. 10, 1997), available at 
http://www.quicklaw.com. 
 183. See, e.g., Alia Hogben, Should Ontario Allow Sharia Law?, TORONTO STAR, June 
1, 2004, at A19 (arguing that family matters should be excluded from the Ontario Arbi-
tration Act to ensure the safeguards of public scrutiny). 
 184. See SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 45–46 (2001). Shachar calls this the “gatekeeping 
function” of family law. Id. at 46. 
 185. See, e.g., Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166 
(1981). 
 186. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 46. 
 187. Id. at 50. The same traditions that may determine cultural membership may be the 
same traditions which subordinate women. Id. For example, Muslim women may not 
marry outside of the faith whereas Muslim men are permitted to marry Jews and Chris-
tians, the so-called People of the Book. ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAS, supra note 15, at 19. 
 188. Canadian Muslim women account for just under half of the total Canadian Mus-
lim population. DAOOD HAMDANI, CANADIAN COUNCIL OF MUSLIM WOMEN, MUSLIM 
WOMEN: BEYOND THE PERCEPTIONS iii (2004), available at http://www.ccmw.com/publi 
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ADR into family disputes must involve protections for vulnerable indi-
viduals and at the same time protect the rights of minority groups to pre-
serve their identity. 
C. The Plan to Establish Muslim Arbitration Tribunals 
Like his predecessor Dr. Baig, Mumtaz Ali took the occasion of the 
Civil Justice Review as a chance to express the concerns of his organiza-
tion and made recommendations for the implementation of Muslim fam-
ily law. He submitted a brief to the Civil Justice Review discussing the 
issues raised in Oh! Canada! Whose Land? Whose Dream? and making 
recommendations for how some of the ideas in the 1991 report could be 
incorporated into the Ontario civil justice system.189 The central and most 
concrete recommendation made by Mumtaz Ali in this brief was to cre-
ate a “Court Annexed Arbitration Board System” to settle disputes using 
Muslim family law.190 Mumtaz Ali made several recommendations for 
implementing such a system based on the Zuber Report.191 The brief 
suggests the Arbitration Board System be established through the ADR 
pilot project.192 The roster of ADR service providers would include pri-
vate arbitrators and, in particular, include specialists in Muslim family 
law who would preside over Muslim family disputes.193 Mumtaz Ali’s 
                                                                                                                                  
cations/Reports/Beyond_the_Perceptions.pdf. See SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 62. See also 
Samuel K. Murumba, Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Human Rights in the Twenty-First 
Century, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21st CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE 
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY (A. Anghie & G. Sturgess eds., 1998). Professor Murumba 
points out some of the weaknesses of communitarianism: 
Indeed, with a little modification, the communitarian criticism of individualism 
can be easily re-deployed against communitarianism itself. It is possible to 
show that individuals are not wholly “situated,” that community, culture and 
society cannot capture the uniqueness of the human person, without remainder; 
it is equally possible to show that the communitarian conceptions of culture and 
society are themselves parasitic upon the very kind of human agency that 
communitarianism question-beggingly locates within them . . . . This much, 
however, we can say: these rival images of individuals and society both com-
pete with, and cannot live without, each other. 
Id. at 229. 
 189. Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44. 
 190. Id. at 37. 
 191. Id. at 37–38. 
 192. Id. at 38. 
 193. Id. Because there are several schools of Islamic law, Mumtaz Ali promises that a 
variety of representatives would represent all the major schools and would apply the 
school of thought subscribed to by the parties. Syed Mumtaz Ali, An Update on the Is-
lamic Institute of Civil Justice, (Aug. 2004), http://muslim-canada.org/news04.html. 
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plans would no longer require parties to submit a statement of defense 
and the parties would no longer hold a settlement conference before pro-
ceeding to arbitration.194 An arbitration award under this system would 
be filed with the Court and deemed an appealable court judgment. Parties 
would not have the option of proceeding to trial because the award would 
be final and binding.195 An independent adjudicative mechanism would 
be established, modeled after the Trinidad and Tobago Muslim Marriage 
and Divorce Act,196 to issue divorce decrees and to determine matters of 
child support and custody.197 The Muslim Arbitration Boards would only 
have jurisdiction over those who registered with the Boards.198 
Mumtaz Ali emphasizes the need for arbitration rather than media-
tion.199 He gives two reasons for this preference. First, utilizing arbitra-
tion would allow the Muslim community to decide family law matters 
using Muslim family law, and arbitration decisions would be final with-
                                                                                                                                  
 194. Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44, at 39–41. Mumtaz Ali 
argues that a statement of defense is not necessary in cases proceeding to arbitration and 
can even be detrimental because it causes even more acrimony between the parties. Id. 
 195. Id. at 39–41. 
 196. The Trinidad & Tobago Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act delegates the regula-
tion of Muslim marriages and divorces to the Muslim community through three recog-
nized Islamic organizations. It establishes an independent Council governed by a Muslim 
Registrar General of Trinidad & Tobago and local Muslim Registrars. The Act provides 
the requisites for a valid Muslim marriage but leaves the interpretation of whether a par-
ticular couple meets the requisites entirely to the Council. Muslims choose to be gov-
erned by the Act by marrying according to its regulations. Muslims are not bound by the 
Act if they choose not to marry according to its rules. While divorce is delegated to the 
recognized Muslim community through this Act, the civil court maintains jurisdiction 
over custody and maintenance. There is no evident opt-out provision for those who no 
longer want to be bound by the Act. Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, 1961, Ch. 45:02 
(Trinidad & Tobago). For a discussion of a similar statute, the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act of 1939, still applicable in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and the diffi-
culties presented by it, see Menski, supra note 84. 
 197. Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44, at 42–43. For a critique 
of “feminist-apologist” understandings of and debates about Islamic law, of which Mum-
taz Ali is arguably among, with particular discussion of Muslim women’s rights in mar-
riage and divorce, see Kecia Ali, Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence: The 
Necessity for Critical Engagement with Marriage and Divorce Law, in PROGRESSIVE 
MUSLIMS ON JUSTICE, GENDER, AND PLURALISM 163–89 (Omar Safi ed., 2003). 
 198. Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44, at App. B1; Michael 
McAteer, Muslims Seek Jurisdiction Over Family Law, TORONTO STAR, May 30, 1991, at 
A2. 
 199. Id. at 41. See also JOHN TIBOR SYRTASH, RELIGION AND CULTURE IN CANADIAN 
FAMILY LAW 98 (arguing advantages of religious arbitration tribunals include their ability 
to keep disputes “within the family” and therefore not unnecessarily expose members of 
the minority to public embarrassment, their ability to encourage settlement, and their 
ability to save costs). 
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out requiring “formal court approval.” Second, arbitration awards would 
be filed with the court and “would enable one to use the judicial/court 
administrative machinery for enforcement and implementation.”200 Since 
that submission, Mumtaz Ali has taken an alternate route towards gain-
ing recognition for Muslim family law by establishing a private Muslim 
arbitration tribunal called the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, or Darul-
Qada, under the auspices of the Ontario Arbitration Act.201 Despite the 
difference in terminology, from court-connected to private, these tribu-
nals retain the capacity to issue judgments enforceable by the civil courts 
since they are governed by the Arbitration Act.202 
The Darul-Qada has attracted much attention and criticism both from 
within and without the Muslim community.203 In response to the growing 
controversy, Attorney General Michael Bryant and Women’s Issues 
Minister Sandra Pupatello appointed Marion Boyd to review the effects 
of religious arbitration tribunals on Canadian society, in particular 
women, and make recommendations for the future.204 On December 20, 
2004, Marion Boyd delivered her report to the Attorney General.205 This 
report recommended that family law remain within the Arbitration Act 
and continue to allow parties to consent to the use of religious law.206 
However, the report recommended several safeguards be implemented to 
                                                                                                                                  
 200. See Review of the Ontario Civil Justice System, supra note 44, at 3. See also Syed 
Mumtaz Ali, The Good Muslim/Bad Muslim Puzzle, The Canadian Society of Muslims, 
June 14, 2004, http://muslim-canada.org/goodbad.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2005) (argu-
ing that while Muslim arbitration tribunals are technically voluntary, Muslims are obli-
gated to submit to this religious authority because they are required to live according to 
Islamic law). 
 201. See Darul Qada, supra note 8. 
 202. Id. (pointing out the finality of arbitration awards in almost all cases with the 
assistance of the Ontario justice system). 
 203. See, e.g., Marianne Meed Ward, Step Backwards, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 14, 2003, 
at 71; Carol Goar, Testing the Limits of Tolerance, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 16, 2004, at A22; 
Lynda Hurst, Ontario Sharia Tribunals Assailed, TORONTO STAR, May 22, 2004, at A01; 
Hogben, supra note 183; Letter from Heather McGregor, Fundamentalism Erodes the 
Rights of Women, TORONTO STAR, June 5, 2004, at B07; Rita Trichur, Muslim Commu-
nity at Odds Over Shariah; Should Faith-Based Tenets be Part of Ontario’s Arbitration 
Act?, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Aug. 23, 2004, at A11; Nadia Khouri, Keep Mosque and 
State Separate, NATIONAL POST, Sept. 21, 2004, at A17. 
 204. News Release, Ministry of the Attorney General, Former Attorney General and 
Women’s Issues Minister to Review Arbitration Processes (June 25, 2004), http://www. 
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2004/20040625arbitrationreview-nr.asp. 
 205. Marion Boyd, Report, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, 
Promoting Inclusion, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/ 
about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.pdf. 
 206. Id. at 133. 
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ensure the protection of vulnerable groups.207 Among the safeguards pro-
posed are regulations established to require that arbitration agreements 
governing family law are in writing and stipulate that certain require-
ments have been met.208 The report also recommends regulations that 
govern arbitrators and that approved arbitrators develop a statement of 
principles for faith-based arbitration.209 The report further recommends 
safeguards for screening parties that include screening for domestic vio-
lence issues and requiring parties to receive independent legal advice.210 
Boyd also recommends that the Government of Ontario undertake exten-
sive education initiatives designed to reach diverse communities, that 
appropriate oversight regulations be established, and that continuing pol-
icy analysis be conducted on the use of arbitration in matters of family 
law.211 The Ontario government spent the next eight months considering 
this proposal.212 
V. THE LEGALITY OF MUMTAZ ALI’S PLAN AND PUBLIC POLICY 
CONCERNS 
A. The Legal Basis for the Tribunals—The Ontario Arbitration Act 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act allows for the implementation of these Mus-
lim arbitration tribunals and requires that parties consent to arbitration.213 
Arbitrators must not show bias to any side and therefore may not use 
specialized knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, for example, to decide a 
matter without allowing the parties to first present their case.214 Although 
                                                                                                                                  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 135. The agreements should declare that the parties have received a “state-
ment of principles of faith-based arbitration” prior to consenting, details of any waiver of 
rights or remedies, a statement recognizing that “the judicial oversight of children’s is-
sues cannot be waived,” and that sections 33 and 56 (governing children) of the Family 
Law Act continue to apply. Id. 
 209. Id. at 136. 
 210. Id. at 137. 
 211. Id. at 138–42. 
 212. See News Release, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario Government Re-
leases Report on Review of Arbitration Process (Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.attorney 
general.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2004/20041220-boyd.asp; News Release, Ministry of 
the Attorney General, Statement by Attorney General on the Arbitration Act, 1991 (Sept. 
8, 2005), http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2005/20050908arb1991. 
asp. 
 213. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 1 (Can.), available at http://www.elaws. 
gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en (“‘[A]rbitration agreement’ means an agreement 
by which two or more persons agree to submit to arbitration a dispute that has arisen or 
may arise between them.”). See ROBERT M. NELSON, NELSON ON ADR ch. 8 (2003). 
 214. See NELSON, supra note 213, at 145. 
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the Arbitration Act is based on commercial arbitration statutes, it has the 
ability to govern non-commercial disputes.215 Under the Act, arbitrators 
have broad powers and courts hesitate to interfere with their decisions.216 
The authorization of the Muslim arbitration tribunals begins with Sec-
tion 32 of the Act.217 Section 32, in allowing the parties to designate the 
rules of law to be applied by the arbitrator, gives the arbitrator the power 
under Section 31 to decide the dispute at hand in accordance with the law 
chosen by the parties.218 The Act does not exclude particular rules of law 
but sets guidelines for conduct and procedure.219 After the parties have 
agreed to submit to arbitration, the broad guidelines of the Act begin 
with the appointment of arbitrators.220 Section 11 requires arbitrators to 
be independent and impartial221 and demands they be forthright about 
anything in their background that could reasonably lead to bias.222 The 
                                                                                                                                  
 215. Id. at 147. While the Act has the ability to govern non-commercial disputes, Nel-
son writes that some subject matters should be excluded from arbitration to protect the 
public interest, including marriage and divorce. Id. at 143. See also John Tibor Syrtash, 
Ontario Has Nothing to Fear, NATIONAL POST, Sept. 21, 2004, at A17 (pointing out that 
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements, including by religious authorities, is noth-
ing new and has existed by statute in Canada since 1889; that the Arbitration Act simply 
codified certain procedures to make them more fair; and that the Charter guarantees that 
rulings involving parties that have been treated unequally will not be enforced by the 
courts). 
 216. See NELSON, supra note 213, at 148. Nelson describes the consequences of par-
ties’ consent to arbitration: 
The Arbitration Act, 1991 imposes what is tantamount to a mandatory stay of 
court proceedings, with certain limited exceptions, in circumstances where the 
parties have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration . . . . [T]he court must 
stay the court proceeding and allow the arbitration to go ahead unless the mat-
ter either falls within one of the limited exceptions or is not a matter which the 
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. 
Id. at 156 (quoting Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada, [1992] 12 O.R.3d 131). 
 217. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 32(1) (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en (“In deciding a dispute, an arbitral tribunal 
shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties or, if none are designated, the rules 
of law it considers appropriate in the circumstances.”). 
 218. Id. § 31 (“An arbitral tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with law, in-
cluding equity, and may order specific performance, injunctions and other equitable 
remedies.”). 
 219. See generally id. §§ 6–30. 
 220. Id. §§ 9–16. 
 221. Id. § 11 (“An arbitrator shall be independent of the parties and shall act impar-
tially.”). 
 222. Id. § 11(2) (“Before accepting an appointment as arbitrator, a person shall dis-
close to all parties to the arbitration any circumstances of which he or she is aware that 
may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.”). 
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sections outlining appointment of arbitrators include provisions for chal-
lenging arbitrators and the procedures for removal.223 If the parties in 
conjunction with the arbitral tribunal cannot resolve the challenge, Sec-
tion 13 allows parties to seek the assistance of the court.224 
Section 19 presents some obstacles. Section 19 requires that parties be 
treated “equally and fairly”225 and have the opportunity to present their 
case and respond to the other side.226 However, this does not necessarily 
mean that a party has been treated “equally and fairly.” Sections 19(1) 
and (2) set forth two separate requirements.227 The Muslim arbitration 
tribunals would presumably meet the requirement of Section 19(2) by 
allowing each party to present their case in the tribunal, even though the 
plan suggests it would not require defendants to submit a statement of 
defense as suggested by Section 25.228 Whether the Muslim arbitration 
tribunals would meet the requirement of Section 19(1) is unclear. Some 
rules of Muslim family law provide for differing treatment of men and 
women; in areas of divorce and inheritance,229 for example, both genders 
would not be treated equally.230 One could argue from a religious view-
point that this differing treatment based on gender does not mean that the 
parties would be treated unfairly,231 but from an objective viewpoint dis-
                                                                                                                                  
 223. See generally id. §§ 13–16. 
 224. Id. § 13(6) (“Within ten days of being notified of the arbitral tribunal’s decision, a 
party may make an application to the court to decide the issue and, in the case of the chal-
lenging party, to remove the arbitrator.”). 
 225. Id. § 19(1) (“In an arbitration, the parties shall be treated equally and fairly.”). 
 226. Section 19(2) reads, “Each party shall be given an opportunity to present a case 
and to respond to the other parties’ cases.”  Id. 
 227. See NELSON, supra note 213, at 159. 
 228. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 25(1) (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en (“An arbitral tribunal may require that the 
parties submit their statements within a specified period of time.”); id. § 25(2) (“The 
parties’ statements shall indicate the facts supporting their positions, the points at issue 
and the relief sought.”). 
 229. Although the Quran introduced progressive inheritance reforms that included 
women among possible heirs, Islamic inheritance law continues to favor male relatives. 
For example, in most interpretations of Islamic law, male children generally receive twice 
the amount that female children receive. See WAINES, supra note 15, at 96. 
 230. See Marianne Meed Ward, supra note 203 (arguing that even if parties voluntarily 
agree to be bound by religious laws that treat women unequally they would per se violate 
the Canadian Charter). 
 231. See Syed Mumtaz Ali, Are Muslim Women’s Rights Adversely Affected by 
Shariah Tribunals?, http://muslim-canada.org/darulqadawomen.html (arguing that wo-
men are granted more rights under Islamic law than under Canadian secular law); Oua-
hida Bendjedou, The Unexpected Protection of Human Rights Under Shari‘a, LAWYERS 
WEEKLY, vol. 24, no. 14, Aug. 20, 2004 (Lexis) (arguing that Shari‘a provides protec-
tions for women and the controversy in Ontario is more indicative of a misunderstanding 
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tinctions made on the basis of gender would clearly not be equal. Addi-
tionally, Section 19 falls under the auspices of Section 3 which allows 
parties to vary or exclude provisions of the Act except for six sections 
including Section 19’s requirement of equality and fairness.232 
The inability to vary or exclude the equality and fairness provisions, 
however, does not make contracting out of these provisions impossible. 
Because the tribunals would be established on a private contractual basis 
governed by the principles of contract law233 and thus outside of the pur-
view of the public courts, they would allow parties to consent to relin-
quishing some of their rights in order to be bound by gender-differential 
Muslim family law.234 These arbitral contracts would not be subject to 
review unless relief was sought before a civil court and fell within one of 
the exceptions of the Act that allow for appeal.235 These exceptions leave 
great discretion to the reviewing court to determine if an appeal should 
be granted.236 In addition to a potential appeal, the Act also allows a 
party to seek to have an arbitral award set aside on several grounds in-
cluding legal incapacity and the failure of the tribunal to treat the party 
“equally and fairly.”237 However, these provisions depend upon the dis-
                                                                                                                                  
of Islam). Cf. DeNeen L. Brown, Canadians Allow Islamic Courts to Decide Disputes; 
Sharia Gains Foothold in Ontario, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at A14 (demonstrating 
that critics of the tribunals fear they will lead to discrimination and are concerned with 
how the tribunals will decide which Islamic law will apply); Hurst, supra note 203, at 
A01 (demonstrating that many Muslim women fear that women immigrants from major-
ity Muslim countries will be coerced into participating because they do not know their 
legal alternatives). 
 232. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 3 (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en (“The parties to an arbitration agreement 
may agree, expressly or by implications, to vary or exclude any provision of this Act 
except the following . . . (2) Section 19 (equality and fairness).”). 
 233. See id. § 5(5) (“An arbitration agreement may be revoked only in accordance with 
the ordinary rules of contract law.”). 
 234. See Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s 
Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (2004) 
(pointing out that the Canadian Charter applies to state actors and does not prohibit pri-
vate parties from agreeing to apply Islamic law under the Arbitration Act but does note 
that “Charter values have been imported into disputes between private individuals in 
order to recognize and redress historic disadvantages endured by women”). 
 235. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 45(1) (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en. For a detailed analysis of the appeal proc-
ess and its likely impact on religious arbitral awards see Bakht, supra note 234, at 9–23. 
 236. Id. § 45(1)(a). 
 237. Id. § 46(1) (“On a party’s application, the court may set aside an award on any of 
the following grounds: 1. A party entered into the arbitration agreement while under a 
legal incapacity . . . . 6. The applicant was not treated equally and fairly, was not given an 
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satisfied party to seek relief in the public courts and to do so within thirty 
days, and do not require the arbitral tribunal to inform the party of their 
rights.238 If a dissatisfied party did seek relief in the courts, a court may 
very well find such provisions antithetical to public policy and refuse to 
enforce a tribunal’s judgment even though the Act does not specifically 
include such a provision. Courts could enforce awards that discriminate 
against women if they found arbitral agreements were contractually 
sound.239 
B. Beyond Legality—Public Policy Concerns 
The critics of the tribunals, including Muslim women’s groups, reject 
the idea of private tribunals because they fear their potential adverse ef-
fects on women.240 They believe the voluntary nature of such tribunals is 
a fallacy and that the tribunals would coerce many women, especially 
immigrant women, into participation.241 They favor excluding family law 
                                                                                                                                  
opportunity to present a case or to respond to another party’s case, or was not given 
proper notice of the arbitration or of the appointment of an arbitrator.”). 
 238. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, §§ 45–47 (Can.), available at http://www. 
e-laws.gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en. See also Bakht, supra note 234, at 8–9 
(quoting a letter to the Canadian Council of Muslim Women from the Ontario Attorney 
General pointing that unjust arbitral awards cannot be dealt with unless they are brought 
to the attention of the courts). 
 239. Bakht, supra note 234, at 4–5. Bakht describes the consequences of consent to 
arbitral agreements, 
Where . . . parties sign an agreement to abide by a ruling and consent is found 
to be voluntary, the courts will likely impute knowledge of the system of laws 
one is submitting to. It is unlikely an argument that one didn’t realize or under-
stand the impact of a particular set of rules would be successful particularly, 
where an attempt to contest the ruling is based on a dislike of the outcome. 
Bakht, supra note 234, at 14. 
 240. See, e.g., Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Concerned About Traditional 
Religious Interpretations, LAWYERS WEEKLY, vol. 24, no. 14, Aug. 20, 2004 (Lexis) (ar-
guing that Islam does not require one to abide by Islamic jurisprudence, which is the 
creation of male jurists living after the time of Prophet Muhammad; that it varies greatly 
throughout the world; and that it is based on a patriarchal model that discriminates 
against women). 
 241. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women voiced their concerns to Marion Boyd, 
Our concern is not with those women who are ‘comfortable’ and knowledge-
able about rights in Canada, and who are unlikely to pursue the arbitration 
process using Sharia/Muslim family law. Our concern is for those of use who 
are newer immigrants, somewhat excluded due to language or customs, who 
turn to their traditional sources such as males, and the Islamic Centre or 
mosque and may not be exposed to mainstream media. These women will be 
persuaded to try the Sharia route because that is what they know in their coun-
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from the Arbitration Act and thereby making the judgments issued by the 
tribunals unenforceable in the civil courts.242 Although this fails to rec-
ognize that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice or any other private reli-
gious tribunals will continue operating nonetheless, they make an impor-
tant point.243 Parties will continue to resolve disputes privately based on 
contractual agreements and many of the judgments will never be dis-
puted in the civil courts. However, the exclusion of family law from the 
Act would deny the enforceability of many more judgments in the civil 
courts by removing the presumption of legality afforded by the Act. Dis-
putes that would find their way into the civil courts could still be en-
forced if a court found that the requisite elements of a contract were es-
tablished.244 As an alternative, disputes brought directly before the civil 
courts could be referred to arbitration and mediation that included reli-
gious clergy with appropriate judicial oversight.245 Religious arbitration 
of family disputes has gone on for millennia and will continue to do so 
but such decisions need not be given the rubber stamp of the Ontario 
court system.246 
                                                                                                                                  
tries of origin and that is what is presented to them as part of the religion. If the 
arbitration process is private and legally binding and this is explained to the 
women as approved by Ontario and Canadian law, why wouldn’t a woman be 
persuaded to go this route?  How would anyone ever hear of any abuse of 
women’s rights? 
Marilou McPhedran & Amina Sherazee, Submission, Review of the Ontario Arbitration 
Act and Arbitration Processes, Specifically in Matters of Family Law, Canadian Council 
of Muslim Women (July 30, 2004), http://www.ccmw.com (follow “Muslim Family 
Law” hyperlink; then follow “Marion Boyd” hyperlink). 
 242. See Resolution 04-11-01, To Remove Family Law from the Arbitration Act of 
Ontario 1991, International Campaign Against Shari‘a Court in Canada, http:// 
www.nosharia.com/resolution-04-11-01.htm. 
 243. See Syrtash, supra note 215. 
 244. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever order specific performance as a rem-
edy for a broken marriage contract because it could potentially bind a woman in marriage 
against her will and therefore be against public policy; a court could conceivably order a 
woman to sacrifice her dowry in order to secure a divorce based on a valid prenuptial 
agreement. See generally Estin, supra note 55. 
 245. This has been in done in some United States jurisdictions. See Quraishi & Syeed-
Miller, supra note 120. 
 246. It is worth emphasizing that even Muslim women’s groups who oppose the Is-
lamic Institute of Civil Justice do not reject Islam but rather particular male-dominated 
interpretations of it. They do not view Islam as incompatible with the ideals of liberal 
democracy but rather as a religion that requires its adherents to strive for justice and 
equality in their daily lives.  For a discussion of Islam and feminism see Sa’diyya Shaikh, 
Transforming Feminism: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice, in PROGRESSIVE MUSLIMS 
ON JUSTICE, GENDER, AND PLURALISM 147–62 (Omar Safi ed., 2003). 
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VI. MODELS FOR REFORM 
The model of private tribunals allowed for under the Ontario Arbitra-
tion Act is a close cousin of the multicultural approach, called the reli-
gious particularist model by multicultural theorist and pragmatist, Ayelet 
Shachar.247 Under the pure form of this model, personal law is delegated 
completely to the Muslim community and Muslim personal law would 
govern Muslims who choose to opt into the system, providing them little 
alternative for opting out.248 Based on a strong multiculturalist arche-
type,249 this gives the Muslim community complete sovereignty over 
their affairs in this area.250 An approach delegating complete sovereignty 
to a religious community without reserving protection for individual 
rights, the approach ultimately sought by Mumtaz Ali, is not optimal for 
Ontario or any liberal democracy.251 
Currently, the Ontario Arbitration Act, although not creating a total re-
ligious particularist system, comes close to this approach. Under On-
tario’s Arbitration Act, individuals must first consent to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction252 but are then bound by its ruling unless they dispute it in 
civil court.253 Rulings by the Muslim tribunal would only be overturned 
or modified in cases of invalid contractual agreements or gross violations 
of public policy.254 Allowing individuals to privately legislate and adju-
dicate matters of family law would remove vulnerable groups, like im-
migrant women and children, from the specter of the public court sys-
tem.255 Marion Boyd’s recommendations seek to expand the circum-
stances under which the decisions issued by the tribunals could be ap-
pealed and implement a system that would provide independent legal 
advice to parties. However, they fail to realize that the independent legal 
                                                                                                                                  
 247. The opposite of the religious particularist model would be the secular absolutist 
model which gives complete power to the state in matters of family law and excludes 
religion entirely from the public sphere. Under this model, a religious authority presiding 
over a marriage ceremony has only symbolic value. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 72–78. 
 248. An example of this is the delegation of personal law to religious communities 
used by Israel today, a country with a diverse religious population, whose laws are oth-
erwise secular. See supra note 118 for further explanation. 
 249. A strong multicultural model favors a great deal of accommodation and inde-
pendence for minority groups. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 28–32. 
 250. This is the opposite of the secular absolutist model which strictly forbids delega-
tion to religious groups. Id. at 72–78. 
 251. See generally Oh! Canada!, supra note 6. 
 252. Arbitration Act 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 1 (Can.), available at http://www.elaws. 
gov.on.ca/tocBrowseCL_E.asp?lang=en. 
 253. Id. § 37. 
 254. Id. § 45. 
 255. See Bakht, supra note 234, at 26–28. 
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advice an immigrant woman receives would likely be from a lawyer in 
her respective community who may approve of skewed interpretations of 
Islam. It also overlooks the idea that arbitration tribunals established 
through a provincial statute should receive sufficient governmental over-
sight such as the kind grounded in a public institution like the Ontario 
courts. 
Decisions issued by the tribunals would have a presumption of legiti-
macy in the Ontario court system when challenged by dissatisfied Mus-
lims. While the courts should have an obligation to take into account the 
religious circumstances of the parties, a religious judgment should not 
automatically gain the rubber stamp of the civil court.256 Additionally, 
Canada would give formal recognition to judgments issued by an Islamic 
organization that in no way represents the Canadian Muslim commu-
nity.257 Because of its establishment under the Arbitration Act, judgments 
issued by the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would have not only a pre-
sumption of legitimacy in the courts but would gain recognition as au-
thoritative decisions of the Muslim community. A determined minority 
of Canadians, who practice Islam, a religion with no central hierarchy, 
could be viewed as the legitimate voice of all Canadian Muslims.258 
Groups who choose not to participate in the Islamic Institute of Civil Jus-
tice or form their own tribunals could be viewed as fringe groups when 
in fact they actually represent the majority of Canadian Muslims. Rather 
than mistakenly entrust the whole gamut of personal law to private legis-
lation, Ontario must find a way to accommodate religious needs with the 
individual protections that make religious freedoms possible.259 
                                                                                                                                  
 256. See Faisal Kutty & Ahmad Kutty, Shariah Courts in Canada, Myth and Reality, 
2004, http://muslim-canada.org/kutty.html (arguing that the most difficult questions sur-
rounding the establishment of the tribunals is what interpretation of Islam will govern and 
that those interpretations influenced by tribal and cultural practices that discriminate 
against women must be excised). See generally NASIR, supra note 15; ESPOSITO & 
DELONG-BAS, supra note 15; DENNY, supra note 2. 
 257. It is difficult to ascertain the number of members of the Canadian Society of Mus-
lims and of those members how many support the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice. 
 258. See DENNY, supra note 2, at 199–200. 
 259. In his discussion of the interaction between law and religion, Peter W. Edge 
points out that the critics of giving legal consideration to religion believe it to be unnec-
essary. They believe it unnecessary because the individual interest in performing reli-
gious dictates is already considered through the government’s general interest in assuring 
individual autonomy. This criticism, however, fails to perceive that religious practice for 
many is not an individual affair but rather is based on communal notions of identity. See 
EDGE, supra note 110, at 17. There are several arguments for giving religion legal con-
sideration. One is based on the importance of religion in the faithful’s life. Edge quotes 
D.O. Conkle, 
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Applying a joint governance model260 would stray from an “either-
or”261 approach and would recognize that individuals have allegiances to 
more than just the state while also recognizing that discrimination occurs 
within religious groups and that vulnerable minorities within the minor-
ity must be protected.262 There is no perfect example of the joint govern-
ance model, but its underlying principles serve as a guide to approach the 
dilemma facing Ontario. Among the strongest versions of the joint gov-
ernance approach is the model of transformative accommodation.263 The 
                                                                                                                                  
Religious beliefs . . . form a central part of a person’s belief structure, his inner 
self. They define a person’s very being—his sense of who he is, why he exists, 
and how he should relate to the world around him. A person’s religious beliefs 
cannot meaningfully be separated from the person himself: they are who he is. 
Id. at 18 (quoting D.O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1164–65 (1988). There are other reasons for giving legal con-
sideration to religion. A second argues that because religion is given unique consideration 
in international law it should be given the same in domestic law. A third argues that the 
religious adherent “suffers a special harm” when her practices contradict with secular 
law. A fourth argues that there is a link between collective interests and religion and giv-
ing recognition will help contribute to pluralism. A fifth argues that religious communi-
ties “benefit society as a whole” and so should be protected. Id. at 17–19. Edge concludes 
that each of the arguments has merit but a flexible approach should be adopted. He 
writes, 
[t]he religious interest should always be considered, because of the strong coin-
cidence of the religious interest and the elements [of the various arguments]. 
The extent to which it should be considered, however, will depend upon how 
far particular factors can be identified in the case which strengthen or weaken 
the assumptions upon which those elements depend. 
Id. at 21. 
 260. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 88–116. This approach of multicultural accommoda-
tion “strives for the reduction of injustices between groups as well as the enhancement of 
rights within them.”  Id. at 87. 
 261. Id. at 85. The either-or approach insists that an individual must either be primarily 
a citizen or primarily a religious person. Id. at 86. 
 262. Shachar has frequently spoken of the paradox of multicultural vulnerability, 
which recognizes the problems created by multicultural accommodation when power is 
delegated to minority groups. This creates “the minority within the minority” which may 
be discriminated against within the group. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Reshaping the Mul-
ticultural Model: Group Accommodation and Individual Rights, 8 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL 
& SOC. ISSUES 83 (1998); Shachar, supra note 38; SHACHAR, supra note 4. 
 263. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 117–45. Another possible variation of the joint gov-
ernance model is the “consensual accommodation” approach, which works like the Trini-
dad Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act. The Trinidad and Tobago Act delegates the regu-
lation of Muslim marriage and divorce to the Muslim community but retains a secular 
option. An individual consents to the jurisdiction of this Act by marrying according to its 
regulations and once that choice is made the individual is bound to divorce by the Act as 
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first of its underlying principles requires that no single arena be dele-
gated entirely to a religious community but rather that shares of that 
arena are delegated.264 The second requires that neither the state nor the 
religious group ever gain exclusive jurisdiction over areas of contention 
but must instead create an environment where the state and the group 
compete for the allegiance of the individual.265 In such an arrangement, 
the state could retain ultimate jurisdiction over custody while the reli-
gious group could retain ultimate jurisdiction over the rules of marriage 
and group membership. The third principle requires that the individual 
always maintain a choice between the competing options.266 When group 
members, whether they are in their citizen capacity or religious capacity, 
retain the right to ultimately opt-out of either, the group is encouraged to 
pay attention to its constituency. In order to make the system viable, opt-
ing-out would be justified only when the group has failed to provide an 
adequate remedy to an individual within its governance seeking a solu-
tion.267 In seeking to establish a model of joint governance the delegation 
of some powers to a religious group can spark an internal debate and 
hopefully transformation.268 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is support for the idea that Canada has already begun to apply a 
joint governance model. The possibility that private Islamic tribunals will 
issue court-enforceable judgments has led to a lively debate both within 
the Canadian Muslim community and within Canadian society as a 
whole.269 It has brought the reality of private family arbitration to the 
forefront of public discussion. The willingness of the Ontario govern-
ment to consider the implications for Muslim women, the minority 
within the minority, shows an increasing willingness to recognize that 
Canadian citizens may have multiple allegiances. Marion Boyd’s report 
takes seriously the concerns of proponents and opponents of the tribunals 
and has made recommendations that will increase discourse in the com-
                                                                                                                                  
well. The problem with this variation is that like the Trinidad & Tobago Act, it has no 
provision for opting out of the system once a choice is made to marry according to Mus-
lim law. Individuals later regretting their choice to marry under the Act have no way of 
ending its sovereignty. Id. at 103–09. See Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, 1961, Ch. 
45:02 (Trinidad & Tobago). 
 264. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 119. 
 265. Id. at 120–21 (Shachar refers to this as the “no-monopoly rule.”). 
 266. Id. at 122. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 118. 
 269. See supra note 203. 
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munity.270 Such a model is establishing “an ongoing dialogue between 
different sources of authority as a means of eventually improving the 
situation of traditionally vulnerable group members.”271 
On September 11, 2005, Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty announced 
that Ontario would outlaw religious arbitration entirely.272 Responding to 
political pressure, McGuinty promised to introduce legislation, but at this 
time, it is unclear what form the legislation will take.273 Amending the 
Arbitration Act to exclude court enforceability of religious judgments is 
advisable. In his response, however, McGuinty should not stifle the de-
bate altogether. Religious tribunals will continue privately and the issues 
of religious accommodation will not disappear. 
In its continuing dialogue, Ontario should look to the examples of Eng-
land, Australia, and the United States. The themes running through these 
nations’ attempts at reconciling religious and secular law will assist On-
tario and other liberal democracies in their own efforts at reform. The 
judiciary and legislatures must be willing to consider parties’ religious 
affiliations, particularly in family disputes.274 The small number of 
judges already considering these affiliations must encourage the expan-
sion of their approach. Legislatures must tackle the legal dilemmas fac-
ing religious communities and take bold steps to accommodate their 
needs, as has been seen in New York and England.275 Initiatives must 
take religious concerns seriously while protecting the individual’s right 
to opt-out of the system. Most importantly, members of the Muslim 
community must be willing and eager participants in both the Muslim 
community and the democratic public sphere. They must expose new 
immigrants not only to the resources of the Muslim community but edu-
cate them about the legal tools available in their adopted homeland, with 
equal responsibility borne by the government as well. 
Canada must embrace a model that recognizes that individuals do not 
have an either-or allegiance to the state versus their religious community 
and that the state cannot endorse a model giving exclusive, court-
enforceable decision making power to one segment of the Muslim com-
munity. While individuals will retain the right to submit their disputes to 
                                                                                                                                  
 270. See Boyd, supra note 205. 
 271. SHACHAR, supra note 4, at 118. 
 272. See generally Colin Freeze & Karen Howlett, McGuinty Government Rules Out 
Use of Sharia Law, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Sept. 12, 2005, at A1; Prithi Yelaja & Robert 
Benzie, McGuinty No Sharia Law; Move Stuns Sharia Foes, Supporters, TORONTO STAR, 
Sept. 12, 2005, at A01.   
 273. Id. 
 274. See supra note 88. 
 275. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999); Divorce (Religious Mar-
riages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.). 
2005] COURTING ISLAM 251 
a private religious tribunal and reserve the possibility that the civil courts 
will enforce such private contractual agreements, issues of family law 
should be excluded from the Arbitration Act. The alternatives explored 
by England, Australia, and the United States have begun to find ways to 
accommodate Muslim family law, perhaps not perfectly, but with an ever 
growing emphasis on awareness, integration, and respect. These ap-
proaches provide practical alternatives to Muslim tribunals established 
under the Arbitration Act in Ontario. These alternatives do not appease 
the religious community—rather, they include them. They are pragmatic 
attempts to begin a dialogue between and within communities and among 
society as a whole. This dialogue seeks to develop modes of cultural ac-
commodation that recognize that the majority approach can be inherently 
biased while the minority approach can infringe upon individual rights. 
Change, of course, is not easy, and while these approaches still need re-
vision, they are most importantly a foundation upon which to build 
meaningful transformation. 
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